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FINISHING THE JOB OF LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM
Mary Beth Beazley*
After many years of committee reports, meetings, and notice
and comment cycles, the new American Bar Association ("ABA")
Standards are finally being phased in.1 The new Standards require
that students receive six credit hours of experiential education
(beyond credits that fulfill other requirements), that law schools
ensure some degree of formative assessment, and that law schools
articulate educational outcomes and take steps toward meeting
these outcomes.2 These educational reforms make perfect sense
based on the evolving demands of the profession, the demographic
shifts in the student body, and the developing scholarship of
teaching and learning.
As with many of the changes to the Standards, the recent
reforms impose more requirements related to teaching, essentially
calling for faculty to spend more time with students and to do more
* Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University. Thanks to Chris Coughlin for inviting me to the Symposium, and to
Madison Benedict and the Wake Forest students who did a great job running it.
Thanks also to Eric Spose and Wake Forest Law Review editors, and to my
colleagues who gave me wise counsel, including Craig Smith, Monte Smith,
Anne Ralph, Laura Williams, Katherine Kelly, and Debby Merritt.
1. The current set of Standards was extensively reviewed by the Council
of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, first from 1996 to
2000, then again from 2003 to 2006, and finally in 2008. ABA STANDARDS &
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS. 2015-2016, at vii (AM. BAR
ASS'N 2015). The Standards were approved in their current form in June 2014
by the Council and approved by the House of Delegates two months later. Id.
Separately, the Rules were evaluated by the Rules Revision Committee, first
from 2004 to 2006, and were thoroughly reviewed again from 2008 to 2014
before their adoption by the House of Delegates. Id.
2. Standard 301 provides that a law school "shall establish ... learning
outcomes" designed to "preparej its students ... for admission to the bar and
for effective, ethical, and responsible participation as members of the legal
profession." Id. § 301, at 15. Standard 302 provides some specifics on
"minimum" outcomes that law schools "shall establish." Id. § 302. Standard
303(a)(3) provides that "[a] law school shall offer a curriculum that requires
each student to satisfactorily complete at least ... one or more experiential
course(s) totaling at least six credit hours." Id. § 303(a)(3), at 16. Standard 314
requires that law schools "utilize both formative and summative assessment
methods in its curriculum." Id. § 314, at 23.
275
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
to prepare law school graduates for legal practice. 3 I fear, however,
that many law schools will react to these changes in the same way
that they have reacted to past changes: by doing their best to
maintain the status quo for the "Brahmins,"4 that is, the subset of
tenure-level faculty who (a) teach Langdell's curriculum and
(b) resist any hint of change in their teaching or scholarship (except,
perhaps, to reduce their teaching hours). Unless reforms shift the
behavior of the Brahmins, we can't hope for meaningful change, and
the new Standards will merely increase the balkanization of the
curriculum. The Brahmins will cling to the old ways of doing things,
while they push the new teaching requirements onto the laps of the
skills faculty who don't have the job security to say no or the power
to spread the reforms beyond their own classrooms.
I cannot define the Brahmins any better than Kent Syverud did
in 2002, when he described their stranglehold on legal education
and their resistance to change:
[The Brahmins] are paid the best; they have job security; they
control most key decisions involving curriculum; they rarely
change what they teach or how they teach it; they largely
teach through a modified Socratic lecture and a single final
examination; they value published legal research, especially to
the extent it will be respected by peers at Harvard, Yale,
Stanford, and Chicago; they like teaching really good students
(like the ones on the law review) but they abhor grading and,
except in seminars, rarely evaluate and correct written work.
Many of them are nice as individuals, but as a group it is a
different matter; they become "The Faculty" (capital T, capital
F), as in the sentence "The Faculty will never agree to
requiring THAT new course in the curriculum."5
Of course, not all tenured faculty are Brahmins in Syverud's
sense of the word. Too many Brahmins, however, are in positions of
control-either as deans or as thought leaders-and they are fierce
protectors of the status quo. The Brahmins successfully protested,
for example, when the ABA proposed standards6 that could have
eliminated tenure requirements for all faculty. I well remember the
Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") session on the topic
that was filled with protesting tenured and tenure-track faculty who
3. For examples, see supra note 2.
4. Kent D. Syverud, The Caste System and Best Practices in Legal
Education, 1 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 12, 14 (2002).
5. Id. at 14.
6. For four proposed alternatives, only two of which were brought forward
for comment, see ABA, STANDARDS REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING AGENDA JULY
12-13, 2013, at 4-7 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/migrated/201 lbuild/legal education/committees/standards reviewdocuments
/july_2013_meeting/201307 src meeting-materials.authcheckdam.pdf.
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vehemently explained why the job security of tenure was both
necessary and important-for them.
And I have other memories. I have memories of Brahmins
patiently explaining to me why tenure is not appropriate for legal
writing or other skills faculty, carefully drawing arbitrary lines to
separate our teaching and our scholarship from that of "the
academy." The Brahmins do not realize that the more they seek to
narrow the definition of tenure, the more they lay the groundwork
for its demise. I am reminded of the words of Edmund Burke,
protesting the attacks on American freedom from British
Parliament during the American Revolution: "To prove that the
Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to depreciate the
value of freedom itself."7 Likewise, if tenure is not needed for full-
time faculty who teach ABA-mandated courses, why is it needed for
those who teach the nonmandated curriculum?8
I rise not to end tenure but to extend it, for the good of law
faculty and of legal education. Extending tenure to legal writing
and other skills faculty9 will help to advance the goals of education
reform in a variety of ways. First, equalizing the power of skills
faculty will allow law schools to get the full benefit of their teaching
and scholarship, a benefit that is currently blunted by ignorance and
bias. Second, fair treatment of skills faculty will advance the values
of equality, diversity, and inclusion: law students will benefit if more
faculty of color embrace skills teaching (which they currently avoid
due to its stigma). Finally, fair treatment of skills faculty will
advance and improve the teaching of practice-related skills,
increasing the vitality of law schools by making legal education
more relevant to the practice of law.
7. Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies (Mar. 22,
1775), in UNIV. OF CHI. PRESS & LIBERTY FUND, THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION ch.
1, document 2 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchls2.html.
8. I understand that many tenured faculty teach courses required within
their own law schools, but the ABA mandates very few specific courses, and
legal writing is the only subject area that is mandated both in the first year and
in the upper level. See infra Subpart L.A_
9. I will often refer to "skills faculty" in this Essay. I mean to include
legal writing faculty, faculty who teach in clinics, academic support faculty,
teaching librarians, and others who hold full-time academic jobs that require
direct (as opposed to vicarious) teaching of students. These faculty may go by
myriad titles in the already-balkanized faculties in law schools across the
United States. I note that I will often focus on legal writing faculty for the
obvious reason that I am most familiar with the contributions made and the
issues faced by these faculty. But I fully recognize that many of my statements
about legal writing faculty are equally true of other skills faculty, and I do not
mean to exclude them.
20161 277
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
The Brahmins must recognize that legal education is changing
and that they can't stop those changes by "insourcing"1o reform to
low-status, full- and part-time faculty. When the ABA first
broached the need for law schools to articulate educational
outcomes-i.e., to actually articulate what they were trying to
teach-the Brahmins also protested. Many claimed that their law
schools had "unique" educational missions that would be hampered
by "overregulation" from the ABA. But the ABA must focus on the
needs of the profession, and it has a fiduciary obligation to ensure
that law schools are preparing their students to enter the practice of
law.
Certainly, not all law schools need to teach an identical
curriculum. Law schools can offer a variety of courses, and they can
offer courses that prepare students to practice law in particular
ways or in particular areas of law. Likewise, they can offer courses
that would prepare their students to be law professors or to use
their law degrees to pursue nonlegal careers. However, if there are
any law schools that are not preparing their students to enter the
practice of law, they need to speak up so their accreditation can be
revoked."'
Consistent with the new ABA Standards, forward-looking law
schools must embrace experiential learning techniques, educational
outcomes, and formative assessment methods. It is ludicrous to
adopt the use of these methods throughout the law school
curriculum 2 and then restrict to low-status positions those faculty
with expertise in these methods.
All full-time faculty deserve the protections of tenure,
regardless of their method of teaching or the subject area of their
courses. Law schools that have denied tenure opportunities to skills
10. I use the term "insource" rather than "outsource" because outsourcing
implies that the work will be done outside the law school. Insourcing is a more
appropriate term because many law schools have brought in low-status, full-
time employees to fulfill the ABA's teaching requirements.
11. As we know, most law faculty come from the top-ranked schools in the
country. Certainly, however, most of the graduates of these elite schools
become lawyers. Thus, even these top-ranked schools must ensure that their
curriculums will prepare their students to enter legal practice.
12. Admittedly, the new Standards specifically do not require that these
methods be used in every course. Standard 314 requires that a law school
"shall use" both formative and summative assessment "in its curriculum." ABA
STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS. 2015-2016
§ 314, at 23 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015). Although Interpretation 314-1 indicates that
multiple assessment methods need not be used "in any particular course," id.,
the language in 314 certainly does not imply that the assessment be limited to
certain types of courses. Further, Standard 301(b) provides that a law school
"shall establish and publish learning outcomes designed to achieve" the
educational objectives of its "program of legal education" as described in
Standard 301(a). Id. § 301(a), at 15.
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faculty have used a variety of justifications, with many deans
claiming a need for "flexibility."13 Flexibility, of course, is a byword
for employers who resist regulation, and deans are no different. The
word typically signals a desire for an at-will workforce, rather than
one protected by unions, fair pay laws, or other standards. Tenure
guarantees many employment protections, but it does not guarantee
any particular salary, nor does it guarantee employment for life.14
Too many deans, however, decry tenure as a mandate that requires
them to keep "deadwood" faculty on the job. This
mischaracterization of tenure becomes a tool to create new
categories of faculty who are labeled as "undeserving' of tenure,
even when those faculty are an integral part of a law school's
educational program. In this way, deans divide the faculty into
factions, leading the Brahmins to see "tenure for all" as a danger to
their well-being.
Significant faculty divisions began to emerge during the 1980s,
when law schools started to create full-time dedicated legal writing
positions. 15 Many legal writing faculty began their careers in ad hoc
positions, with unclear expectations and workloads. As the
requirements of those positions came into focus, however, it became
clear that legal writing faculty were similarly situated to others on
the faculty: they were tasked with teaching law students a course
that prepared students for the practice of law; they performed
service as appropriate; and they produced scholarship as a way to
develop the theory and practice of their field, to explore its limits,
and to communicate their discoveries to others. As I can attest from
personal experience and from the experiences of colleagues around
the country, many legal writing faculty were acting like their other
faculty colleagues, regardless of their job titles or job security.
The ABA recognized the value that these legal writing faculty
were providing, and in 1983 it incorporated the standard requiring a
"rigorous" writing experience in the first year. 16 The ABA has also
13. See Memorandum from Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Professor of Law,
Maurice A. Dean Sch. of Law at Hofstra Univ. & J. Lyn Entrikin, Professor of
Law, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. Ark. at Little Rock, to Council of the
ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar 18 (Jan. 30, 2014)
[hereinafter Neumann & Entrikin Memorandum], http://www.alwd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Standard-405-Neumann-Entrikin.pdf (discussing the
ways in which tenure does not interfere with a dean's "flexibility").
14. Id. at 2, 6-8.
15. E.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal Writing:
Law Schools' Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 7 (2001) ("The
appearance of a cadre of low-pay, low-status positions in skills courses flowed
from two major events in the history of American law schools: the sharp rise in
general law school enrollment in the 1970s and early 1980s and the influx of
women into law schools in the mid-1970s.").
16. Kenneth D. Chestek, MacCrate (In)Action: The Case for Enhancing the
Upper-Level Writing Requirement in Law Schools, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 121
2016]
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
recognized the value provided by other skills faculty, mandating
"substantial" opportunities for clinical courses, 17 and a "reasonable
opportunity" for appropriate academic support.18 Further, Standard
316 makes apparent how important it is for law schools to prepare
students for the bar exam; it articulates complex methods for
determining whether a law school's bar passage rate is "sufficient"
to meet the Standards. 19
Taken together, these changes show a significant shift from the
purely academic, PhD-like focus of legal education, to a perspective
that encourages-indeed, it mandates-preparation for legal
practice. But as this shift has occurred, too many Brahmins have
tried to maintain an out-of-balance focus on scholarship and push
the new teaching requirements onto new, low-status (often female)
faculty. Scholarship was the focus throughout the boom times in
legal education, as law schools used prestige and publication to
chase U.S. News status, 20 reducing teaching hours for the Brahmins
in hopes of increased scholarly output. Even during this time of
market correction, the practice-related ABA requirements-the
teaching of writing, the formative assessment, the clinics, the
outcomes-focused teaching, and the experiential opportunities-
have too often been cabined in courses taught by low-caste faculty,
while the Brahmins go on with their Socratic lectures and their
theoretical scholarship as if nothing had changed at all.
(2007) ("Historically, the ABA Standards on teaching legal writing were more
aspirational than mandatory, leaving the schools with broad discretion in how
to meet the stated goals. For example, in 1973, the Standards only required law
schools to 'offer ... training in professional skills, such as counseling, the
drafting of legal documents and materials, and trial and appellate advocacy.'
By 1983 that requirement had changed to a requirement that law schools
'shall... offer to all law students at least one rigorous writing experience."'
(footnotes omitted)).
17. See ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAw
SCHS. 2015-2016 § 303(b)(1), at 16.
18. Id. § 309(b), at 21.
19. Id. § 316, at 24-25. On March 25 of the year of this publication, the
ABA Council on Legal Education submitted for notice and comment a revised,
much more streamlined version of Standard 316, requiring that "[a]t least 75
percent of a law school's graduates in a calendar year who sat for a bar
examination must have passed a bar examination administered within two
years of their date of graduation." Memorandum from Hon. Rebecca White
Berch, Council Chairperson & Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of Accreditation
& Legal Educ., to Interested Persons & Entities 6 (Mar. 25, 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal-education/resources/notice-and
_comment.html.
20. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Not Clinical Education? 16 CLINICAL L.
REV. 35, 40 (2009) (noting how colleagues at one law school rejected ideas to
create clinical opportunities for their students and observing that these faculty
"far preferred to hire more faculty who would do scholarship that would
enhance the school's academic reputation rather than [to hire] clinical faculty").
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It is time to strike a new balance between teaching and
scholarship in legal education. This new balance does not require
law schools to abandon their scholarly focus and concentrate solely
on skills. The scholarly enterprise is, and should be, vital to the
future of legal education and legal practice. Instead, law schools
must make fundamental changes in how they value the teaching
and scholarship of all full-time faculty who prepare their students
for legal practice.
True legal education reform must re-form both the teaching and
the scholarly missions of the law school by engaging all full-time
faculty in both. Unless the ABA finishes the job of reform by
mandating equal treatment for all full-time faculty, educational
reform will be piecemeal and scattershot, with token courses meant
to dot the i's and cross the t's being taught by low-caste faculty who
don't have the power to take the next steps in educational reform.
Legal education will continue to be a segregated system, a system
that stifles scholarly voices that might generate new knowledge
about teaching, practice, or legal policy.
This Essay will first describe the current ABA Standards on
status, particularly as they relate to legal writing faculty, explaining
how these Standards contradict the ABA's diversity and inclusion
standards and result in a segregated underclass in the legal
academy; this underclass inhibits not only gender, class, and racial
inclusion but also student learning. Second, this Essay will identify
the formal and informal barriers to academic freedom for legal
writing faculty. Third, this Essay will explain how "disrespected"
skills scholarship underlies the current reforms, and how this
scholarship is already expanding its focus to generate knowledge
about other issues of legal practice and legal theory. Finally, this
Essay will discuss next steps that the law schools, the ABA, and the
AALS can take to ensure the continued viability of law schools by
embracing current and future reforms.
I. PREACHING VS. PRACTICE: THE IMPACT OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION
Law schools are governed by two organizations, one professional
(the ABA) and one academic (the AALS). The ABA is the
accrediting body, and it issues Standards for Legal Education that
law schools must meet to be accredited. 21 The ABA sends a team of
evaluators on a "site visit" to each accredited law school every
21. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
2015-2016, at v (noting that since 1952, the United States Department of
Education has granted law school accrediting authority to the ABA's Council of
the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, and that "[t]he
Standards contain the requirements a law school must meet to obtain and
retain ABA approval").
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seventh year to ensure that the law school is meeting these
standards. 22
Although the AALS is not an accrediting body, it is the main
professional organization for law schools. The AALS counts 179 of
America's 200 or so law schools as members and states that its
mission is "to uphold and advance excellence in legal education,"
and that it "promotes the core values of excellence in teaching and
scholarship, academic freedom, and diversity, including diversity of
backgrounds and viewpoints."23  The AALS has bylaws that it
encourages member schools to meet,24 and it participates in ABA
site visits by designating one team member as the AALS
representative. 25 In addition to any ABA duties, that team member
evaluates whether the law school is measuring up to the AALS "core
values" in its teaching, scholarship, and service.
Both of these organizations say that they place a high value on
equality and diversity. ABA Standard 205(b) provides that "[a] law
school shall foster and maintain equality of opportunity for
students, faculty, and staff, without discrimination or segregation on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, age, or disability."26 Standard 206(b) goes even further,
requiring law schools to demonstrate by "concrete action [their]
22. Id. at 179 (laying out "operating procedures" for the "Accreditation
Project" of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar and
noting that "[s]ite evaluation teams shall include, as appropriate, educators,
practitioners, administrative personnel, and judges. Site evaluation teams
must be of sufficient size to accomplish the purposes of the site evaluation").
23. See About, ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS., http://www.aals.org/about/ (last
visited Apr. 18, 2016).
24. See ASs'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., Bylaws of the Association of American Law
Schools, in 2015 HANDBOOK § 2-2, at 50 (2015) (noting that compliance is a
matter of "overall quality" of a school as measured against the requirements,
and that "the statements of Approved Association Policy and the Regulations"
are "not meant to be taken as implying that formal compliance with their
specific terms is necessarily equivalent to satisfaction of the qualitative
requirements, or that departure from any of their specific terms is
automatically demonstrative of qualitative failure").
25. See ASS'N OF AM. LAw SCHS., AALS Statement of Good Practices on
Impartiality and Propriety in the Process of AALS Membership Review, in 2015
HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 121, 121-23 [hereinafter ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS.,
Statement of Good Practices]; see also ASS'N OF AM. LAw SCHS., Executive
Committee Regulations, in 2015 HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 69, § 5.6, at 86
(2015) [hereinafter ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS., Executive Committee Regulations]
('The site evaluation report on a member or applicant law school made on
behalf of the Association, whether or not it is made on behalf of the American
Bar Association also, shall be furnished to the dean of the school and the
President of the institution. They shall be informed that the report is not for
publication . . ").
26. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAw SCHS.
2015-2016 § 205(b), at 11.
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commitment to diversity and inclusion by having a faculty and staff
that are diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity."27
Similarly, the AALS Bylaws provide, in a section entitled
"Diversity: Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action," that "[a]
member school shall provide equality of opportunity in legal
education for all persons, including faculty and employees[,] with
respect to hiring, continuation, promotion and tenure."28
The ABA Standards also require that law schools protect the
academic freedom of their faculties.29 Likewise, the AALS Bylaws
specify that it expects its members to "value" academic freedom.30
Of course, virtually every university includes academic freedom in
its faculty rules or policies. 31
And yet, when it comes to academic freedom and equality of
opportunity, some faculty are more equal than others. 32 At most law
schools in the United States, full-time legal writing faculty are
excluded from many of the rights and privileges accorded to full-
time faculty who teach contracts, constitutional law, torts, or other
subjects. They are usually excluded from the tenure track,
employed on some other kind of contract that may have to be
individually negotiated.33 Likewise, they may have no voting rights
or, at best, limited rights.34 They may not be expected to produce
scholarship; if they are allowed to do so, they may not be eligible for
scholarship support, such as summer grants or money to pay
27. Id. § 206(b), at 12.
28. ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS., supra note 24, § 6-3(a), at 59.
29. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW ScHs.
2015-2016 § 405, at 29.
30. ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS., supra note 24, § 6-1(b)(2), at 58 ("The Association
values and expects its member schools to value ... scholarship, academic
freedom, and diversity of viewpoints.").
31. See, e.g., Georgetown University Faculty Handbook, GEO. U. 1 (Aug. 14,
2015, 1:20 PM), https://georgetown.app.box.com/s
/tnko6e76d6yplsxdrie6wntea78xl5ol ("To... fulfill the University's mission,
faculty must be guaranteed the academic freedom and the resources enabling
them to shape the character and intellect of our students, to break new ground
in research, and to render service of the greatest value to the public as well as
the University.").
32. The allusion, of course, is to GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 78 ("All
animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others.").
33. ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING Dis. & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE
ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 2014, at v (2014) [hereinafter ALWD/LWI 2014
SURVEY], http://lwionline.org/uploads/FileUpload/2014SurveyReportFinal.pdf
(showing 42 out of 179 schools indicating any legal writing faculty in tenure-
line positions, with some of those same schools and the rest of the other schools
reporting that legal writing faculty held one of five different varieties of
contract).
34. Id. at 83 (reporting that forty law schools deny voting rights to legal
writing faculty, and that ten of these schools deny legal writing faculty the right
to attend faculty meetings; seventy-nine schools provide limited voting rights).
2016] 283
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student research assistants. 35 Finally, as will be discussed in the
next Part, even if they are on a tenure track or in some other
employment situation that allows or expects publication, they may
be actively discouraged from producing scholarship related to the
field of legal writing, as defined by whoever is doing the judging.
The current Standards and Bylaws, and the ways in which they
are implemented, contradict the principles that the ABA and the
AALS say that they stand for. Further, when it comes to legal
writing faculty, these standards have resulted in a "pink and white
ghetto" that inhibits effective teaching, particularly as it relates to
faculty diversity.
A. Important Courses, Unimportant Faculty: Legal Writing and
ABA Standards
The vast majority of legal writing faculty are not in tenure-level
jobs. In the 2014 annual survey of legal writing faculty, sponsored
by the Association of Legal Writing Directors ("ALWD") and the
Legal Writing Institute ("LWI"), 36 only ten percent of respondent
law schools reported that their legal writing courses were taught
exclusively by tenure-track faculty; eighty-two percent of the
respondents reported that some or all of their legal writing faculty
were on some sort of long- or short-term contract. 37 In some ways, it
is surprising that any legal writing faculty have been granted
traditional tenure. For despite their supposed support for equality
and academic freedom, the ABA and the AALS are, respectively,
openly hostile and virtually silent as to the status of legal writing
faculty.
The ABA sends conflicting messages about the importance of
legal writing, valuing the teaching of legal writing much more
highly than it values its teachers. The effective teaching of legal
writing is apparently vital in law school, for "rigorous" legal writing
teaching is required both in the first year and beyond the first
year.38 Further, legal writing has been singled out in the recent
revisions to Standard 302 that require law schools to articulate
learning outcomes. 3 9 For the most part, law schools are given only
general guidance as to what subject areas to provide outcomes for;
Standard 302(a) says, somewhat generally, that a law school must
have learning outcomes that include "competency" in "[k]nowledge
35. Id. at 78, 106 (reporting at least forty-five schools whose legal writing
faculty are ineligible for summer research grants).
36. These two organizations are the two major organizations providing
professional development for legal writing faculty.
37. ALWD/LWI 2014 SURVEY, supra note 33, at 5-6.
38. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
2015-2016, § 301(a), at 15, § 303(a)(2), at 16 (AM. BARASS'N 2015).
39. Id. § 302, at 15.
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and understanding of substantive and procedural law."40 Standard
302(b), however, specifies that law schools must articulate learning
outcomes for the pillars of the legal writing course: "I]egal analysis
and reasoning, legal research, problem-solving, and written and oral
communication in the legal context."41
The ABA also gives legal writing special attention when it
comes to academic rigor. Standard 301(a) requires that "a law
school shall maintain a rigorous program of legal education." 42
Further, Standard 303(a)(2) provides that law schools must provide
"one writing experience in the first year and at least one additional
writing experience after the first year, both of which are faculty
supervised." 43 The faculty who are supervising these "experiences"
have a lot to do. The "rigor" of a writing experience, unlike the rest
of the "rigorous" curriculum, is closely defined by the ABA.44
Although "one writing experience" seems to indicate that a single
draft of a single assignment might fill the bill, Interpretation 303-2
says otherwise: "Factors to be considered in evaluating the rigor of a
writing experience include the number and nature of writing
projects assigned to students, the form and extent of individualized
assessment of a student's written products, and the number of
drafts that a student must produce for any writing experience." 45
Thus, it appears that by writing "experience," the ABA has
something quite specific in mind. The faculty member must design
an "experience" that includes a "number of drafts" and
"individualized assessment." And, of course, each law student must
be provided a second, upper-level, faculty-supervised writing
"experience" that also includes a "number of drafts" and
"individualized assessment."
No other subject area gets this much specific guidance in the
Standards, nor is any other subject required to be taught in the first
year and in the upper level. 46 So the ABA says that teaching legal
40. Id. § 302(a).
41. Id. § 302(b).
42. Id. § 301(a). The word "rigorous" was originally applied only to legal
writing, see Chestek, supra note 16, but in a recent revision, the word was
eliminated in the legal writing standard and applied to the entire program of
legal education in Standard 301(a). ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS. 2015-2016, § 301(a), at 15. The term is not defined
in the Standards or Interpretations except as it relates to legal writing;
Interpretation 303-2 describes how to evaluate the rigor of a legal writing
experience. Id. at 17.
43. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
2015-2016 § 303(a)(2), at 16.
44. See supra note 42.
45. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAw SCHS.
2015-2016 § 303-2, at 17.
46. I do not mean to imply that the Standards don't require a thorough
legal education; however, the Standards allow the schools to determine what to
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writing is important. Surprisingly, however, the people who teach it
are apparently far less important.
The ABA Standards spell out exactly how law schools can
discriminate against those who teach legal writing. ABA Standard
405(b) requires, somewhat vaguely, that law schools must have an
"announced policy" regarding academic freedom and tenure, and
identifies a sample policy, which is attached in the first appendix to
the Standards and is described as "an example [that] is not
obligatory."47 That sample statement on academic freedom notes
that its text "follows the '1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure' of the American Association of University
Professors."4s
The American Association of University Professors' ("AAUP")
statement provides that after a probationary period that should not
exceed seven years after "appointment to the rank of full-time
instructor or a higher rank," teachers "should have permanent or
continuous tenure," with termination allowed only "for adequate
cause," age, or for "extraordinary. . . financial exigencies." 49 In a
footnote defining "full-time instructor," the AAUP notes that "[tihe
concept of 'rank of full-time instructor or a higher rank' is intended
to include any person who teaches a full-time load regardless of the
teacher's specific title."50  Thus, the ABA citation to the AAUP
standards seems to indicate that it endorses access to tenure for all
full-time faculty, regardless of title or subject area. The ABA has,
unfortunately, contradicted that implicit endorsement.
In practice, Standard 405(b) has been understood to mean that
all or most full-time faculty should be eligible for tenure. The ABA
teach with very few exceptions. The Standards provide that schools must teach
a two-credit course in professional responsibility. Id. § 303(a)(1), at 16. They
imply that law schools should teach civil andlor criminal procedure. Id. § 303-
2(a), at 15 (requiring that learning outcomes include "[k]nowledge and
understanding of substantive and procedural law" (emphasis added)). Further,
the Standards have for several years encouraged clinical teaching. Id.
§ 303(a)(3), (b)(1), at 16 (requiring that law schools provide "substantial
opportunities" for "law clinics or field placement(s)"). For further discussion on
first year requirements, see Melissa H. Weresh, Fostering A Respect for Our
Students, Our Specialty, and the Legal Profession: Introducing Ethics and
Professionalism into the Legal Writing Curriculum, 21 TouRo L. REV. 427, 434
(2005) ("Standard 302(a)(1) undoubtedly requires some baseline of standard 1L
classes, traditionally including a generous dose of Torts, Contracts and
Property; however, the only explicit designation is that for legal writing.").
47. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
2015-2016 § 405(b), at 29.
48. Id. app. at 189.
49. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretative Comments, in POLICY
DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3, 4 (B. Robert Kreiser ed., 9th ed. 2001).
50. Id. at 6 n.5.
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has signaled agreement with that understanding by specifying
which faculty are not required to be made eligible for that status.
Standard 405(c) provides that a law school may award "clinical
faculty members" a status that is "reasonably similar to tenure."51
Interpretation 405-6 defines "reasonably similar to tenure" as a
series of long-term contracts of at least five years in duration that
are "presumptively renewable or [that have some] other
arrangement sufficient to ensure academic freedom."52 Neither the
Standards nor the interpretations define what kind of "other
arrangements" might be sufficient to ensure academic freedom.
Legal writing faculty fare even worse under the ABA Standards.
Standard 405(d) provides that:
[a] law school shall afford legal writing teachers such security
of position and other rights and privileges of faculty
membership as may be necessary to (1) attract and retain a
faculty that is well qualified to provide legal writing
instruction as required by Standard 303(a)(2), and
(2) safeguard academic freedom. 53
This language creates a catch-22 for legal writing faculty who
seek to improve status conditions at their own school. Unless they
wish to prove a loss of academic freedom (a difficult task), they must
either leave their jobs (to show that the job conditions were not
sufficient to "retain" them), or argue that they themselves are not
"well qualified" in legal writing instruction.
Surprisingly, the AALS has tacitly endorsed this unequal
treatment. As with the ABA Standards, the AALS Bylaws single
out legal writing as a subject area that is necessary to the law school
curriculum. Section 6-7 of the AALS Bylaws provides general
guidance on the importance of having a good law school curriculum;
the only subject area mentioned by name, however, is legal writing:
"[a] member school shall offer courses in a wide variety of fields
often enough to afford students a meaningful opportunity for study
and shall assure that every student receives significant instruction
in legal writing and research."54
And other provisions seem to indicate that legal writing faculty
should be treated as equals. The AALS does not merely recommend
the AAUP statement on academic freedom. Bylaw Section 6-6(d)
provides: "A faculty member shall have academic freedom and
tenure in accordance with the principles of the American Association
51. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
2015-2016 § 405(c), at 29.
52. Id. § 405-6, at 29-30.
53. Id. § 405(d), at 29.
54. ASS'N OFAM. L. SCHS., supra note 24, § 6-7(d), at 62.
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of University Professors."55 As noted above, the AAUP does not
make distinctions among types of full-time faculty. Likewise, at
first glance, the AALS Bylaws do not seem to distinguish between
full-time legal writing faculty and full-time faculty who teach other
subjects.
AALS Bylaw Section 6-1, which articulates AALS "core values,"
provides that
[t]he Association values and expects its member schools to
value: (i) a faculty composed primarily of full-time
teachers/scholars who constitute a self-governing intellectual
community engaged in the creation and dissemination of
knowledge about law, legal processes, and legal systems, and
who are devoted to fostering justice and public service in the
legal community. 56
Section 6-4(a) defines "[f]ull-time faculty member" as meaning
"a faculty member who devotes substantially the entire time to the
responsibilities of teacher, scholar, and educator."57 Section 4.2 of
the Executive Committee Regulations, however, notes:
For purposes of this chapter [governing academic freedom and
tenure], 'faculty member' means a professional who is or was
tenured, on the tenure track, or, although not on the tenure
track, engaged in teaching or scholarship, including work in a
clinical or research and writing program at a member school.58
Thus, the AALS Bylaws not only indicate that legal writing
faculty should have the protections of tenure, but also
simultaneously hollow out this mandate by recognizing that clinical
and legal writing faculty are possibly "not on the tenure track."
To sum up, the language of the AALS Bylaws and Regulations
indicates that full-time legal writing faculty of all statuses are
included in its definition of full-time faculty, and that therefore full-
time legal writing faculty "shall" have academic freedom and tenure.
According to the AALS Bylaws, then, law schools are not in
compliance with AALS standards if they hire full-time faculty who
do not have permanent or continuous tenure after the expiration of
a probationary period. These faculty should be able to be
terminated only for adequate cause, age, or for extraordinary
financial exigencies. Yet I know of no record of any instance in
which the AALS has denied or rescinded membership of a law school
due to the lack of tenure for its legal writing faculty or even after
55. Id. § 6-6(d), at 61 (emphasis added).
56. Id. § 6-1(b)(i), at 58.
57. Id. § 6-4(a), at 59.
58. ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS., Executive Committee Regulations, supra note 25,
§ 4.2, at 79.
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legal writing faculty have been terminated without cause.59 This is
not to say that anyone has challenged AALS membership on this
basis; rather, the AALS, like the ABA, has demonstrated a
remarkable lack of curiosity about the treatment of legal writing
faculty.
B. Demographics of Legal Writing Faculty: A Pink and White
Ghetto
The demographics of legal writing faculty have been profoundly
affected by the ABA and AALS standards and the way in which they
have been applied. Legal writing is a "pink ghetto";60 perhaps more
significantly, it is also almost entirely white. For almost twenty
years, ALWD and the LWI have collaborated on a survey that
usually has a response rate of over 90% of accredited law schools.
Tellingly, for the last five years, the ALWD/LWI survey has reported
nearly the same statistics about the demographics of legal writing
faculty: full time legal writing faculty are about 72% female and
only 28% male. 61 During that same time period, about 87.9% of full-
time legal writing faculty were identified as "Caucasian."62  By
contrast, an AALS survey reported that only 72% of full-time faculty
were identified as white in 2009, the last year for which data is
available. 63 More recent ABA statistics identify 20% of law faculty
as nonwhite. 64
59. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, A Plea for Rationality and Decency: The
Disparate Treatment of Legal Writing Faculties as a Violation of Both Equal
Protection and Professional Ethics, 39 DuQ. L. REV. 329, 329 (2001) ("I was
understandably dumbfounded when, on April 7, 2000, the Dean (of one year)
summoned me and two other writing professors into his office to announce
bluntly that he had unilaterally decided to overhaul the legal writing program
and that our contracts would not be renewed.").
60. E.g., Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gender
Bias in Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 563 (2000) ('The 1996 Report of
the American Bar Association's Commission on Women in the Profession urged
law schools to 'maintain employment environments that are free of both
actionable discrimination and subtle barriers to equal opportunity that operate
to create a "pink ghetto" for women faculty."' (quoting COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS'N, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN
LEGAL EDUCATION 4 (1996))).
61. ALWD/LWI2014 SURVEY, supra note 33, at 68 tbl.71(b).
62. Id. A note accompanying the data admits that five percent fewer
schools reported the racial makeup of their legal writing faculties, but says that
"[o]ne thing is clear: the profession has been and continues to be
overwhelmingly Caucasian, regardless of the racial classifications in the
missing data." Id.
63. Meera E. Deo, Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal Academia, 29
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 352, 356-57 (2014) (citing AALS numbers).
64. Lucille A. Jewel, Oil and Water: How Legal Education's Doctrine and
Skills Divide Reproduces Toxic Hierarchies, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 119
289
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Many scholars have addressed the issue of legal writing as
"women's work."65 The disparate percentages of women in these
low-paying, low-status jobs is a problem by its mere existence; 66 res
ipsa loquitur. It cannot be true that women are attracted to legal
writing because women like lower-paying jobs.67 Nor does legal
writing accommodate traditional gender roles by allowing women
more "flexibility" to fulfill home duties; if anything, legal writing's
high number of student-contact hours makes teaching legal writing
a less flexible job than teaching contracts or torts.68 Women are
more likely to teach legal writing for the myriad reasons that
women always dominate the lower-paying, lower-prestige positions
in any field, for the same reasons that higher-prestige positions in
any field become lower-prestige positions if "too many" women
occupy them.69 As Richard Neumann observed in 2000, "as soon as
[legal writing] became large enough to be considered an underclass,
it was stereotyped as female-a situation that continues to this
day."7 0
(2015) (citing statistics of law school faculty and staff by ethnicity and gender
collected by the ABA and published yearly on its website).
65. E.g., Pamela Edwards, Teaching Legal Writing as Women's Work: Life
on the Fringes of the Academy, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 75, 75, 77 (1997).
66. See also Durako, supra note 60, at 585 ("Law schools have a
responsibility to model nonsexist behavior and to acculturate law students into
their new professional community.... Maintaining a pink ghetto and a group
of second-class citizens within that ghetto harms the field of legal writing, legal
education more generally, and ultimately the legal profession. And singling out
one course, taught primarily by women, for second-class treatment is inherently
suspect.").
67. One of the many problems legal writing faculty face is that nontenure-
level positions are often individually negotiated, a factor which tends to disfavor
women. See, e.g., Christine Elzer, Wheeling, Dealing, and the Glass Ceiling:
Why the Gender Difference in Salary Negotiation Is Not a "Factor Other Than
Sex" Under the Equal Pay Act, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 34 (2009) ("[C]ourts,
employers, and perhaps even the plaintiffs themselves proceed on the
[erroneous] assumption that the sexes are similarly situated when it comes to
bargaining power.").
68. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law School
Faculties, 2009 BYU L. REV. 99, 128-35 (describing demanding characteristics
of legal writing teaching and noting that it is a "gendered" position).
69. See Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools:
Findings and Open Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 711 (2006) ("[N]o single
theory of discrimination is likely to explain the glass ceiling or sex-segregated
jobs in law schools. They are all likely operating concurrently, to a greater or
lesser extent, depending on other characteristics of the law school in question.").
70. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the
Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 326 (2000). Sadly, Neumann's
statistics showed that in 1998, women made up about seventy percent of legal
writing faculty; id., the number is now seventy-two percent. ASSOCIATION OF
LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE, supra note 33, at 68
tbl.71(b).
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Perhaps it is a chicken-and-egg question to ask whether more
women end up in fields with less prestige, or whether fields have
less prestige because more women are in them. The "repeatedly
validated" Implicit Association Test has consistently reflected that
"most people harbor unconscious biases in a variety of areas,
including race, gender, and disability."71 Yet somehow, law deans
seem to presume that they are immune from this bias, implying that
it is merely a coincidence that an ABA-required course taught
primarily by female faculty is also the course with the least prestige.
To base the lack of prestige on the substance of the course is not
accurate. As Deborah Merritt noted in a recent blog post, skills
faculty teach "the heart" of lawyering; Professor Merritt questions
the attitude of doctrinal law faculty who "persist in thinking that
legal writing and clinical professors do work that is less
intellectually challenging or valuable." 72  One criticism of legal
writing has been that it is "just" grammar,73 which is at best
imprecise. Legal writing is not focused on grammar any more than
tax law is focused on math.74 The prestige of courses is often an
arbitrary matter of luck and power.
Legal writing should not necessarily have more prestige than
other courses; however, it is contrary to reason that a mandatory
course deemed vital by the bench and bar should have less prestige.
The titles of articles that address these issues reveal a growing
awareness of the problem, and a growing realization that the
problem is not going away. In 1997, Maureen Arrigo noted that "in
the culture of the law school, many doctrinal [law] faculty view
teaching legal writing as beneath their dignity-in a sense,
degrading," in her article entitled Hierarchy Maintained: Status and
Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs.75 In 2001, Kathryn
Stanchi and Jan Levine expressed their astonishment that they
found more sexism in legal education than they had found in law
practice in their article entitled Gender and Legal Writing: Law
71. Debra Lyn Bassett, Three Reasons Why the Challenged Judge Should
Not Rule on A Judicial Recusal Motion, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 659,
662-63 (2015); see also Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 ILL.
B.J. 40, 41 (2014) ("No one is immune from the influence of implicit bias.").
72. Deborah J. Merritt, Little Staff Attorneys, LAW SCH. CAF9 (Jan. 21,
2016), http:l/www.lawschoolcafe.org/2016/01/21/little-staff-attorneys.
73. E.g., J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A
Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35, 42 (1994) (debunking an attitude that legal
writing courses should "focus mostly on grammar").
74. Mary Beth Beazley, "Riddikulus!" Tenure-Track Legal-Writing Faculty
and the Boggart in the Wardrobe, 7 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79, 81 (2000).
75. Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in
Legal Writing Programs, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 117, 185 (1997).
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Schools' Dirty Little Secrets. 76 And in 2015, the introduction to a
symposium on discrimination in legal education titled The More
Things Change...: Exploring Solutions to Persisting Discrimination
in Legal Academia, Professor Melissa Hart observes that "[sikills
teachers tend to be paid less, have less job security, and have lower
status within their institutions. Given that women are over-
represented in skills teaching positions and under-represented
among tenured and tenure-track faculty, this two-track system
significantly exacerbates gender inequality in law schools."77
The segregation of legal writing positions as undervalued
"women's work" does more than hurt the careers of the women and
men who take those positions. First, when we undervalue any
position, we lose the contributions of those who decide not to join the
field because of its low value and of those who enter the field but
who leave because they cannot afford the financial or psychological
costs. Second, and perhaps most importantly, we discourage people
of color from entering or staying in the field.
With the current status situation, it is not surprising that
faculty of color avoid legal writing positions; one imagines that such
discrimination would be particularly off-putting for these faculty.
Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb has argued:
[L]egal writing occupies a marginalized space within the legal
academy. Professors of color, particularly women of color,
already occupy a marginalized space within the academy. The
convergence of both marginalizations makes the field of legal
writing, in its current configuration, bad ground for women of
color to "invest their resources of education, intelligence, time
and talents so as to produce a fruitful yield. ' 78
Professor Lorraine K. Bannai discusses women of color who
teach legal writing, describing them appropriately as "challenged
times three." She notes that women of color in legal writing face
particularly daunting challenges:
76. Stanchi & Levine, supra note 15, at 4 ("[D]isparate treatment of faculty
based on gender is most obvious in law schools when one looks at the faculty
teaching legal writing, which is the fundamental skill most important to the
training of future lawyers and judges.").
77. Melissa Hart, The More Things Change...: Exploring Solutions to
Persisting Discrimination in Legal Academia, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2
(2015) (1 note that Professor Hart is not a legal writing faculty member); see
also Kristen K. Tiscione & Amy Vorenberg, Podia and Pens: Dismantling the
Two-Track System for Legal Research and Writing Faculty, 31 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 47, 49 (2015) ("[T]he perception that teaching legal research and
writing is unintellectual 'women's work' continues as part of the social fabric of
law schools." (footnote omitted)).
78. Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Writing at the Master's Table: Reflections on
Theft, Criminality, and Otherness in the Legal Writing Profession, 2 DREXEL L.
REv. 41, 43 (2009) (footnote omitted) (quoting Arrigo, supra note 75, at 121).
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I... know (1) that untenured women of color who teach Legal
Writing face additional challenges because of their lower
status in the academic hierarchy; (2) that those additional
challenges are often invisible to, or ignored by, others, even
those who might be allies on issues of race and gender; and (3)
that their lack of status can demean and silence them, as well
as prevent their institutions from benefiting from all they can
contribute as scholars, teachers, and colleagues. 79
Professor Lucy Jewel has argued that faculty of color "are
making the rational decision to reject skills teaching jobs in favor of
tenure-line positions. Being familiar with second-class treatment,
there is little incentive for a teacher of color to experience further
unequal treatment within a law school."8 0  Professor Jewel also
addresses issues of class, in addition to race and sex, and argues
that the "[skills/doctrine] dichotomy ... reinforces harmful race,
class, and gender hierarchies in the legal academy and ... produces
an elitist knowledge hierarchy that prevents students from
obtaining a holistic legal education."81
Racial diversity is important for every subject area, but it may
be even more important in legal writing. Recognizing faculty of
color as excellent legal writers (through their roles as legal writing
faculty) can provide disconfirming evidence against any bias about
the writing skills of lawyers of color; this technique will be counter-
effective, however, if these faculty have lower status.8 2 Further,
legal writing faculty of color can bring the usual benefits of diversity
to the legal writing curriculum. Several years ago, I attended a
meeting of a newly formed diversity committee within one of the
major legal writing organizations. I expected the discussion to focus
on status and how it created entry barriers to faculty of color.
Instead, the committee-dominated by legal writing faculty of
color-began to discuss how to address legal writing issues relevant
to our students of color. I was abashed that I had not anticipated
that this idea would be on the agenda, but the meeting served to
reinforce to me the benefits of diversity in every subject area.
As Professor McMurtry-Chubb has argued, the close instruction
that legal research and writing ("LRW") faculty provide makes it
79. Lorraine K. Bannai, Challenged X 3: The Stories of Women of Color Who
Teach Legal Writing, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 275, 276 (2014).
80. Jewel, supra note 64, at 122.
81. Id. at 112.
82. See, e.g., Arin N. Reeves, Yellow Paper Series: Written in Black and
White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions of Writing Skills,
NEXTIONS (2014), http://www.nextions.com/wp-content/files-mf
/14468226472014040114WritteninBlackandWhiteYPS.pdf (building on a
finding in a previous study that "supervising lawyers are more likely than not
to perceive African American lawyers as having subpar writing skills as
compared to their Caucasian counterparts").
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even more important that these positions are staffed by a diverse
faculty of equal status:
If LRW programs continue to be structured in a manner that
makes them the less desirable choice in the academy for people
of color, students will lose access to these diverse
perspectives-these different ways of knowing and
experiencing the world. Without knowledge of these
experiences, students will absorb the process by which legal
institutions protect white privilege and power without
consciousness of this process as such.8 3
Professor McMurtry-Chubb also observes that "[t]he absence of
people of color from LRW also imposes unique harms on law
students," because without faculty of color in this important course,
"the process of teaching students how to 'think like lawyers'
within... a structure already historically organized around the
analytical processes of elite white male judges, leads directly to the
replication of a racist and elitist legal structure."8 4
In summary, the ABA Standards require law schools to take
"concrete steps" to promote gender and racial equality. The ABA
also requires that legal writing be taught in the first year and again
after the first year. It has recently updated the Standards in ways
that will incorporate at every law school educational theories and
practices pioneered in legal education by many legal writing faculty.
And yet, this same set of standards also spells out exactly how law
schools can provide substandard jobs to legal writing faculty,
resulting in a faculty underclass that is mostly white and mostly
women.
The AALS is complacent about this treatment and is therefore
complicit. The AALS requires that its member law schools have
tenure policies consistent with the AAUP's statement on academic
freedom and tenure.85 That statement indicates that all full-time
faculty-regardless of their titles-should be eligible for tenure after
a probationary period.8 6 The AALS's own Bylaws indicate that legal
writing faculty are "full-time" faculty.8 7 Yet when the AALS
participates in site visits, it makes no special effort to determine
whether legal writing faculty are equal members of their faculties or
are required or encouraged to be "teachers/scholars," and it keeps as
83. McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 78, at 55.
84. Id. at 54.
85. ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS., supra note 24, § 6-6(d).
86. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, supra note 49.
87. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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members law schools who discriminate against legal writing
faculty.88
If the ABA truly values legal education and wishes to reform it,
then the ABA must value all faculty. The proposed reforms all
relate to skills teaching; they will be ineffective if legal writing
faculty and other skills faculty do not have equal status. Faculty
who are not eligible for tenure are not full participants on the
faculty committees and in the faculty meetings where curricular
decisions are hammered out. They may hesitate to speak up, feeling
that their status brands them as "inferior" to the Brahmins; even if
they do speak up, their lack of equal power inhibits their ability to
push curricular changes. Further, even those legal writing faculty
who have voting rights are often not allowed to vote on the hiring
decisions that have a significant impact on a law school's
curriculum.8 9
If the ABA wants to change the status quo in legal education, it
must change the status quo for legal educators. If the ABA
Standards regulating status remain unchanged, faculties will resist
curricular reform, or isolate it within courses taught by low-caste
faculty, retaining the Brahmins' "right" to do things the old way.
For reformers to achieve their full goals, they must equalize power
on law faculties by equalizing status.
II. FORMAL AND INFORMAL BARRIERS TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR
LEGAL WRITING FACULTY
When I counsel younger legal writing faculty who have one of
the rare tenure-level positions, one of the first questions I ask is,
"Are you allowed to write about legal writing?" Many legal writing
faculty have been told explicitly that they should not write about
legal writing,90 or that they should wait until after tenure to do so.
88. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. To be fair, if the AALS
were to ban all law schools that discriminate against legal writing faculty, its
membership would be small indeed.
89. See, e.g., Susan P. Liemer, The Hierarchy of Law School Faculty
Meetings: Who Votes?, 73 UMKC L. REV. 351, 365-66 (2004) ("The faculty 'are
the people who ought to decide educational matters-from the setting of the
curriculum to the hiring and tenuring of professors-because they have the
disciplinary training and knowledge to make informed decisions in those
areas."' (quoting Joan Wallach Scott, The Critical State of Shared Governance,
ACADEME, July-Aug. 2002, at 41, 42)).
90. See, e.g., Jan M. Levine & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Women, Writing &
Wages: Breaking the Last Taboo, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 551, 559 (2001)
(noting that many legal writing faculty "were not even permitted to produce
articles about legal writing in their quest for tenure" (citing Jan M. Levine,
Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and Tenure-Track Directors and Teachers in
Legal Research and Writing Programs, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 530, 541 (1995)
(describing the bias against legal writing scholarship as a "self-fulfilling
prophecy"))).
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Others have been given broad hints; they do not need to be told
twice. While my faculty granted me tenure based on legal writing
scholarship, not all legal writing faculty are so fortunate.91 A study
conducted in 2005 revealed that seventy-five percent of scholarship
produced by legal writing faculty was focused on nonlegal writing
topics. 92
Certainly, some legal writing faculty have scholarly interests
other than legal writing, just as some torts professors have scholarly
interests other than torts. When legal writing faculty are
discouraged from writing in their teaching area, though, the field
suffers in at least two ways. First, legal writing is a young field; it
needs substantive scholarship to help increase and generate
knowledge about the theory and practice of legal writing, and the
ways in which each impact legal education, law, and public policy.
Second, legal writing faculty who are told not to write about legal
writing learn that the field is not respected or secure, and they are
discouraged from continuing to teach in the field. When young
scholars leave legal writing for more secure or more respected
positions, legal writing loses expertise that is crucial to our law
students, and thus to the future of the legal profession.
The roots of the bias against legal writing scholarship are hard
to trace, but bias may have resulted from the reality that some early
legal writing scholarship was focused on pedagogy or, to be more
precise, on andragogy (adult learning theory).93 For many years,
legal writing faculty did not stay on the job long enough to even
consider writing: many jobs had two-year caps that forced faculty to
91. Even among my own faculty, it was not a universal attitude. When I
relied on an appellate advocacy textbook as a tenure piece, one faculty member
(now retired) suggested that no book about how to write an appellate brief could
be considered scholarship and agreed that it would be better if I got future
topics approved in advance. Interestingly, several years later when I relied on
articles about ballot design and government communication as promotion
pieces, one of my faculty advocates worried that some would think those articles
were not focused enough on legal writing. These articles had grown directly out
of legal writing teaching and scholarship; fortunately, their focus was
apparently not an issue, and I was promoted.
92. Terrill Pollman & Linda H. Edwards, Scholarship by Legal Writing
Professors: New Voices in the Legal Academy, 11 LEGAL WRITING 3, 10 (2005)
("[Ajpproximately 75% of the law review articles legal writing professors have
published are about topics in areas other than legal writing, while only
approximately 25% are about legal writing topics. Even using the broad
definition of legal writing scholarship described below, most of what legal
writing professors have published in the traditional venues for legal scholarship
is outside the field." (footnote omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning: A
Metacognitive Approach to Legal Education, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 33, 47 n.71
(2006) (citing MALcOLM KNOWLES, THE ADULT LEARNER: A NEGLECTED SPECIES
54 (4th ed. 1998) ("The concept of andragogy is defined as the 'art and science of
helping adults learn,' and was meant to be an alternative to pedagogy.")).
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move on just when they were getting their feet under them. As
Michael Smith observes, "Until an academic subject is
professionalized, that is, until an academic subject is undertaken by
people with the experience, time, and resources to explore its
intellectual boundaries, the growth of its doctrine will be slow." 94
The caps on legal writing teaching, of course, signaled a widely-held
attitude that expertise was not needed to teach legal writing, that
we were just cleaning up the punctuation of the fully-realized
thoughts that students had formed in their other courses.95 As Dean
Erwin Chemerinsky observed in 2009, casebook faculty "assume"
that full-time faculty are needed to teach "contracts and
constitutional law," and this assumption "would seem even more
warranted for teaching of skills."96
As the caps disappeared and faculty stayed longer in legal
writing positions, they discovered that they were teaching thinking,
not grammar, and that their new field needed a scholarly
foundation. That need is true of many new fields, but the subject
matter in many of those fields can be taught with established
teaching methods. Legal writing was different. New legal writing
faculty, many of whom had never taken a real course in the subject
themselves, needed to know not only what to teach, but how to teach
it. 97 So legal writing faculty wrote short, to-the-point, "how I did it"
pieces. These pieces were tremendously useful to faculty around the
country struggling with the new legal writing courses, but they did
94. See Michael R. Smith, Foreword, The Next Frontier: Exploring the
Substance of Legal Writing, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 22 (2004).
95. See generally Mary Beth Beazley, Better Writing, Better Thinking:
Using Legal Writing Pedagogy in the "Casebook" Classroom (Without Grading
Papers), 10 LEGAL WRITING 23, 48 (2004) (describing the discredited
"instrumental" theory of writing, which assumes that "all of the thinking takes
place before writing begins, and [that] the writer uses the written word merely
to record or transcribe those thoughts"); Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 73, at
42.
96. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 39. Dean Chemerinsky discussed an
experience at a law school where he had served on the faculty; the faculty was
discussing a proposal to replace the students who were teaching legal writing
with full-time faculty. Dean Chemerinsky noted that "[m]any faculty members
asked for proof that a professor can do a better job of teaching legal writing
than law students" can, further noting that faculty just "assum[e]" that
professors will do a better job than students at "teaching contracts or
constitutional law" and observing that this assumption "would seem even more
warranted for teaching of skills." Id.
97. E.g., Beazley, supra note 95, at 31 ("One reason that Legal Writing
faculty have been forced to become pedagogical innovators is that .... [m]any of
us had graduated from law schools where there was no formal legal writing
instruction, or only a student-taught program, and so we did not even have
valid notes that we could look back on.... [W]e were on our own, and we had
to figure it out." (footnotes omitted)).
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not match traditional criteria for "acceptable" scholarship. 98 Legal
writing faculties were not doing case analysis in their articles.
Their scholarship was more "meta": they were writing about how to
teach someone else how to do case analysis.
So, some of the negative attitude against legal writing
scholarship may have come from these nontraditional, early days
pieces that many legal writing faculty-including myself-wrote.99
As will be explained below, legal writing scholarship has rapidly
evolved; unfortunately, the attitude against it has not.
Legal writing scholars, like feminist scholars and critical race
scholars before them, are too often told that their scholarship is not
"legitimate," and that we should write about something else. 00
Indeed, just this year, in an article describing methods for moving
legal writing faculty to the tenure track, the otherwise sympathetic
author suggested that legal writing faculty seeking to move to the
tenure track should "publish... provocative articles" that would
"[i]deally," be focused on subjects relating to legal doctrine, "rather
than about teaching or legal writing."'101 On the other hand, I know
of at least one legal writing scholar who received tenure on the basis
of provocative articles about the status of legal writing faculty, an
experience one of his colleagues described as "postmodern.' 10 2
The push for scholarship is part of the modern era in legal
education, which began when Christopher Columbus Langdell
instituted a series of changes in how law is taught and how law
schools are structured. The Langdellian movement sought to
distance legal education from the trade school model and align it
98. E.g., Smith, supra note 94, at 24 ('Most torts and constitutional law
professors, for example, do not write on how to teach torts or constitutional law.
They write about the substance of their respective subjects. ... Legal writing
professionals, by contrast, have tended to write not about the substantive
nature of legal writing and legal analysis, but about how to best teach these
subjects. This disparity, this deviation from the norm in the legal academy,
allows the perception that legal writing lacks enough substance to engage its
own scholars.").
99. E.g., Mary Beth Beazley, The Self-Graded Draft: Teaching Students to
Revise Using Guided Self-Critique, 3 LEGAL WRITING 175 (1997) (describing
legal writing teaching methods).
100. See, e.g., Harvey Gee, Beyond Black and White: Selected Writings by
Asian Americans Within the Critical Race Theory Movement, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J.
759, 769 (1999) (discussing the controversy about "the validity of Critical Race
Theory"); bell hooks, Theory as Liberatory Practice, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 5
(1991) (talking about ways to 'legitimize" feminist scholarship).
101. Catherine Martin Christopher, Putting Legal Writing on the Tenure
Track: One School's Experience, 31 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 65, 80-81 (2015).
102. Conversation with Professor Jan Levine, sometime in the twentieth
century. I recount these details from memory, so please forgive any
inaccuracies.
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with more intellectual scholarly fields.'0 3 Law study was seen as
scientific, theoretical, and scholarly. As a result, law schools began
to seek faculty members who were more like the PhD-holding
faculties in other departments. Many of these faculty saw (and still
see) their main goal as generating knowledge about the theories
behind legal doctrine and many spent (and still spend) much of their
time teaching their students about legal theory rather than about
legal practice. 104 Theory and theoretical knowledge have been
prized far above practical knowledge, with some arguing that too
much time in practice could hurt one's chances for admission into
"the academy."'105
The hierarchies in place at most law schools now reflect this
bifurcated view. Those faculty who teach theoretical subjects are
prized, and they are most likely to hold the highest-paying tenure-
track jobs that are the plums of the legal academy. 0 6 These faculty
have ample time for scholarship if they implement the traditional
teaching methods in these courses: a series of lecture and discussion
classes with only one examination at the end of the semester, or a
seminar course focused on an area of scholarly interest.107
Legal writing faculty, on the other hand, usually have less time
for scholarship due to the high number of student contact hours that
their courses require.10s It is not unusual for a legal writing course
103. See Harold Anthony Lloyd, Raising the Bar, Razing Langdell, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 231, 231 (2016).
104. E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 39. Dean Chemerinsky also
discusses faculty colleagues who rejected a proposal to hire clinical faculty by
arguing that the "preeminent purpose of the law school" is not "training
lawyers" and that the law school is not a "trade school." Id. at 40.
105. See, e.g., Lisa Eichorn, Writing in the Legal Academy: A Dangerous
Supplement?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 105, 114-15 (1998); Michael Z. Green, "Just
Another Little Black Boy from the South Side of Chicago " Overcoming Obstacles
and Breaking Down Barriers to Improve Diversity in the Law Professoriate, 31
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 135, 145 (2015) ("[B]ecause I had practiced law for five
years by this time, I was informally told there was some concern that I was not
committed to full-time doctrinal teaching and might need to pursue the route of
clinical or legal writing teaching, given the amount of practice experience I had
already obtained.").
106. E.g., Syverud, supra note 4, at 14.
107. Nevertheless, most law schools also award research money to these
faculty in the summer to encourage them to produce the theoretical scholarship
that is published in the student-edited law reviews at high-ranked schools. See,
e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Tribute, The Bow-Tie Era of Lewis and Clark Law
School: Dean Jim Huffman, 1993-2006, 37 ENvTL. L., at v, vi (2007) ("Huffman
dramatically expanded summer research grants for faculty as well as research
assistant positions for students. The result was an unprecedented outpouring
of scholarship .... ").
108. See McGinley, supra note 68, at 128-35 (describing the demands of
legal writing faculty). And summer does not always provide research time.
Clinical faculty may have clients whose cases continued beyond the end of
April. Academic support faculty may be providing guidance while graduates
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to require five to ten teacher work-hours of individual formative
assessment per student, per semester. This individual work comes
in the form of individual critiques on student papers, individual
conferences, and individual performances and critiques (such as oral
arguments). Thus, because a forty-student load is typical for legal
writing faculty, each hour of individual assessment is the equivalent
of one week of full-time work. Accordingly, depending on course
structure and required assignments, a modern legal writing teacher
may spend the equivalent of five to ten weeks of the semester just on
individual assessment. This time, of course, does not include time
spent preparing for classes, time spent teaching, time spent
developing problem ideas, time spent preparing to critique, or time
spent on other common faculty requirements, such as committee
work, letters of recommendation, or, of course, scholarship and
service.
The heavy teaching requirements in legal writing create a
second catch-22 for legal writing faculty. At many law schools,
tenure-level faculty are expected to devote as much as half of their
time to scholarship, with the rest to be divided between teaching
and service. 109 On the other hand, especially due to the necessary
student contact hours previously mentioned, legal writing teaching
jobs may require faculty to spend more than half of their time on
teaching alone. When law schools use the heavy teaching load as a
reason to deny these faculty tenure-level positions (based on their
perceived inability to produce "enough" scholarship),' 10 they are
sending the unspoken message that spending time preparing
students to enter legal practice is not as valuable as time spent
publishing articles.
study for the bar. All skills faculty who are on nine-month contracts may be
seeking remunerative employment for the summer to make up for their lower
pay. And these faculty members may not be eligible for summer research
money. See ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL WRITING
INSTITUTE, supra note 33, at 78 tbl.76.
109. See John D. Copeland & John W. Murry, Jr., Getting Tossed from the
Ivory Tower: The Legal Implications of Evaluating Faculty Performance, 61 Mo.
L. REV. 233, 241-43 (1996) (discussing how scholarship is the most important
aspect of faculty evaluation and noting that teaching effectiveness is second and
public service a distant third).
110. See Adam Todd, Neither Dead nor Dangerous: Postmodernism and the
Teaching of Legal Writing, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 893, 943 (2006) ("Scholarship is
the area that many law faculties indicate is important for advancement in the
profession and is used to justify a lower status for legal writing professionals in
the academy. Paradoxically, legal writing professionals are simultaneously not
given institutional support, time, space, and encouragement to perform writing
which is so highly valued. It is paradoxical and ironic that those members of
the legal academy paid and trained to teach writing are implicitly discouraged
from the act of writing." (footnote omitted)).
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Time spent on effective teaching of courses that fulfill ABA
requirements should be considered to be time well spent.
Interestingly, many law schools change teaching and scholarship
expectations for associate deans and other faculty administrators,
recognizing that the workload of an administrator is incompatible
with normal expectations of teaching and scholarship. These
schools implicitly value administrative work as the monetary equal
of scholarly work; apparently, these schools also value time spent on
administrative work as superior to time spent on effective teaching
of courses that fulfill ABA requirements.
The teaching of legal writing is vital to the success of legal
education, and thus of the legal profession. 1 ' Skills education is
more likely to be direct education; that is, the faculty provide direct
formative feedback to their students. The students perform
lawyering tasks, and the faculty then diagnose specific problems
that each student has. Direct education is contrasted with the
vicarious education of the Socratic classroom. The Socratic method
presumes that those not participating in Socratic dialogues will
participate vicariously, silently compare their own thought
processes to the teacher-student conversation, self-diagnose their
problems, and be able to fix those problems. 112 The direct teaching
that legal writing faculty provide is every bit as valuable to the
academy, and the legal profession, as time spent producing
scholarship.
Legal writing teaching will thrive when its faculty have the
academic freedom to pursue their scholarly interests, as well as
support and incentives to produce scholarship. Most casebook
faculty are spurred to publish by the rewards of promotion and
tenure; they get financial support from their law schools in the form
of high salaries, summer grants, and occasional courseload
111. A recent survey of over 300 attorneys, commissioned by LexisNexis,
reported that "[alpproximately two-thirds of litigation attorneys deem Writing
and Drafting Skills to be highly important skills among newer associates, but
particularly when it comes to Drafting Pleadings, Motions, and Discovery
Documents." LEXISNEXIS, WHITE PAPER: HIRING PARTNERS REVEAL NEW
ATTORNEY READINESS FOR REAL WORLD PRACTICE 5 (2015),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20150325064926_large.pdf.
112. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning
Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 S.D.
L. REV. 347, 351 (2001) ('Vicarious instruction assumes some sort of rebound
learning effect .... [It] presupposes that the nonselected students know to play
along, answering the queries in their heads and learning to think like lawyers
by experiencing vicariously what the speaking student actually experiences.");
see also Linda H. Edwards, The Trouble with Categories: What Theory Can
Teach Us About the Doctrine-Skills Divide, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 181, 220 (2014)
("The teaching of legal analysis in a large 'doctrinal' classroom is often
haphazard and does not offer sustained, individual practice or individual
accountability for mastery of the skill.").
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reductions; they are also allowed to write about the law-related topic
of their choice. Legal writing faculty should have the same support
and incentives. Admittedly, the high teaching loads may require a
different balance between scholarship and teaching, but law schools
that have made appropriate adjustments for faculty administrators
can certainly do so for legal writing faculty.
In 1995, Jill Ramsfield and Christopher Rideout eloquently
described the potential of legal writing scholarship and illustrated
the harms caused by limits on that scholarship:
[Legal writing scholars] are scholars of a new discipline. Our
work, so carefully cut out for us by our predecessors,
continues. ... We do not yet know the depth of our discipline,
nor have we fully articulated its breadth. We own a rare
moment in scholarship, a moment of discovery and careful
preservation, a moment of intellectual adventure. As we
develop our discipline, we can work together to chart its
magnificent terrain and preserve its natural beauty. 113
There is no reason to think that legal writing faculty will not
continue-or increase-their scholarly productivity if given
appropriate support for their scholarship. For legal writing
scholarship to reach its true potential, however, and for it to provide
its true benefits, arbitrary limits on its development must cease, and
legal writing faculty must receive the full academic freedom to
which they are entitled.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL WRITING SCHOLARSHIP AND ITS
IMPACT ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND LEGAL PRACTICE
Thankfully, many legal writing faculty have ignored the
conventional wisdom and have chosen to write about pedagogy,
about legal writing, or about legal writing pedagogy. They have
done so for a variety of reasons, from having a supportive faculty, to
not being "limited" by the possibility of a tenure vote, to not giving a
damn.114 Whatever the motivation, much legal writing scholarship
has helped to lay the foundation for the vibrant teaching of legal
writing that is going on in law schools today. Further, many of
113. Jill J. Ramsfield & J. Christopher Rideout, Scholarship in Legal
Writing, in THE POLITICS OF LEGAL WRITING-PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE
FOR LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING PROGRAM DIRECTORS 75, 91 (Jan Levine et al.
eds., 1995).
114. See, e.g., Beazley, supra note 95, at 36-37. In that article, I note that
the intrinsic reward of legal writing scholarship for overburdened legal writing
faculty who "grew hungry not just for sleep, but for knowledge about useful
pedagogy... was the joy of having a more successful semester, of seeing our
students' writing improve, of having better papers to read on those long nights.
We published not to meet tenure requirements, but because we wanted to share
our triumphs with others who we knew were in the same boat." Id.
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these same articles have also laid a foundation for the new ABA
Standards. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, legal writing
scholars are fulfilling a role common to all kinds of scholars: they
are following circuitous routes and developing new paths to
knowledge, knowledge that will affect not only legal education but
also legal practice and legal policy. As Kent Syverud observed in
2004, "The scholarship of legal writing and the theory of legal
writing have.., come a long way indeed."115
The full-time faculty who have been teaching legal writing over
the past thirty-five years have contributed greatly to its
development, starting with the "how to" pedagogy pieces described
above and moving to theoretical and doctrinal scholarship about
legal writing, exploring its substance and broadening its horizons.
One of the first legal writing faculty to articulate the theoretical
foundations of legal writing scholarship was Teresa Godwin Phelps,
in her 1986 article, The New Legal Rhetoric.116 In that piece,
Professor Phelps argued, somewhat radically for the time, that
"[w]riting is a disciplined creative activity that can be analyzed and
described; writing can be taught."117  In 1999, Professor Linda
Berger continued the exploration of New Legal Rhetoric, arguing
that "New Rhetoric promises teachers and students a powerful
alternative for embarking on legal discourse, a disorienting and
open-ended back-and-forth exploration that can help law students
develop the habits of mature legal readers and writers."118
This Essay is far too short to provide a complete history of the
evolution of legal writing scholarship. Thankfully, others have done
so. In 2004, Michael Smith analyzed several different types of
existing and emerging legal writing scholarship. 119 Professor Smith
identified five subcategories of legal writing scholarship:
Scholarship on Program Design and the Administration of Legal
Writing Programs; on Legal Writing Pedagogy; on Legal Writing as
a Profession; on Legal Writing Scholarship; and, finally, on the
Substance of Legal Writing.120 His article focused on this fifth type,
noting that one of its benefits was that its audience reached beyond
115. Kent Syverud, Better Writing, Better Thinking: Concluding Thoughts,
10 LEGAL WRITING 83, 84 (2004) ("[Early in my career], the notion that there
was a theory underlying my work in teaching writing was not just 'invisible,' it
was unthinkable.").
116. Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089,
1094-98 (1986). I was a member of Professor Phelps's first legal writing class
in 1980.
117. Id. at 1096 (emphasis omitted).
118. Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb
and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 155
(1999).
119. Smith, supra note 94, at 26.
120. Id. at 5-8.
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legal writing faculty to include "all people who engage in legal
writing as part of their profession such as lawyers, judges, law
students, and legal scholars." 121
In 2005, Linda Edwards and Terrill Pollman compiled a
comprehensive bibliography of scholarship by legal writing faculty
to accompany their article analyzing the boundaries-and vistas--of
legal writing scholarship. 122 They identified four categories of
"appropriate" topics for legal writing scholarship: "[Llegal writing
topics include those related to (1) the substance or doctrine legal
writing professors teach; (2) the theories underlying that substance;
(3) the pedagogy used to teach that substance; and (4) the
institutional choices that affect that teaching."123 Five years later,
Pollman and Edwards joined with Professor Berger to explore new
trends in legal writing scholarship and to recommend a focus on
rhetoric, broadly defined, noting that "[t]he study and practice of
'law as rhetoric' is a thread that can run through the fabric of a
professional life, weaving together the legal writing professor's work
in scholarship, teaching, and professional service."'124
Like many other areas of intellectual inquiry, legal writing
scholarship is interdisciplinary, drawing insights from a host of
other fields. Legal writing scholars have explored the relationships
between legal writing and cognitive sciences,125  behavioral
economics, 126 document design, 12 7 and universal design.128 As
Professors Berger, Edwards, and Pollman have observed, articles
121. Id. at 8.
122. Pollman & Edwards, supra note 92, at 59-212 (listing a "selected"
bibliography of works by legal writing faculty).
123. Id. at 19.
124. Linda L. Berger, Linda H. Edwards & Terrill Pollman, The Past,
Presence, and Future of Legal Writing Scholarship: Rhetoric, Voice, and
Community, 16 LEGAL WRITING 521, 522 (2010) (footnote omitted).
125. E.g., Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites, Building Types, and
Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory of the Learning Progression of Law
Students, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 315, 321 (1997) (recommending that teachers
use "a cognitive theory that explains the evolutionary learning process of law
students").
126. See, e.g., Mary Beth Beazley, Ballot Design as Fail-Safe: An Ounce of
Rotation Is Worth a Pound of Litigation, 12 ELECTION L.J. 18, 29 (2013)
("[Blehavioral economics also offers new justifications for changing ballot
ordering laws.").
127. See, e.g., Ruth Anne Robbins, Painting with Print: Incorporating
Concepts of Typographic and Layout Design into the Text of Legal Writing
Documents, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 111 (2004) ("[M]ost of the
accepted principles of document design are grounded in scientific study.").
128. See, e.g., Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Bridging the Law School Learning Gap
Through Universal Design, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2012) ("The result of
Universal Design of instruction in the law school classroom will be a better
learning environment for all students and an energized, creative professor who
adds new dimensions to teaching the law.").
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about the teaching of legal writing can "draw not only on
composition and literary theory but also on linguistics, classical and
contemporary rhetoric, and critical theory, including feminist
theory."129 Both legal writing theory and pedagogy theory benefit
from the insights of psychology. Robin Wellford-Slocum has
observed that psychology helps us understand "how people think,
learn, communicate, solve problems, and interact with one
another."130 That field of study is of obvious interest to legal writing
faculty, whose scholarship advances the understanding of how best
to teach this new subject, and of how lawyers should use legal
writing to communicate with judges, opposing counsel, and their
clients in a way that would help these various audiences learn, solve
problems, and interact with one another.
Of course, like all areas of intellectual inquiry, legal writing
scholarship is not moving in a linear way, and it would be illogical to
chart only one path for its development. Two areas of growth,
however, are particularly noteworthy in the context of the future of
legal writing faculty and their scholarship. First, pedagogy-focused
legal writing scholarship has traced-and led-the recent reforms in
legal education. (Thus, it is particularly ironic that the ABA
reforms leave legal writing faculty in their low-caste status, even as
the Standards enshrine many teaching methods developed and
championed by legal writing scholars.) Second, current legal writing
scholarship is building on its pedagogical foundations to reach out
into areas relevant to legal practice and legal policy. When law
schools discourage legal writing scholarship, they limit the
development of knowledge about legal education, legal practice, and
legal policy.
A. How Legal Writing Scholarship Has Provided an Infrastructure
for Legal Education Reform131
Legal writing scholarship that explores how law students learn
about legal writing also reveals how law students learn in every
other course in the law school. Legal writing faculty are teaching
"thinking in concrete," 132 so scholarship about how to improve that
129. Berger, Edwards & Pollman, supra note 124, at 527.
130. Robin S. Wellford-Slocum, The Law School Student-Faculty Conference:
Towards a Transformative Learning Experience, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 255, 257
(2004).
131. This Subpart cites numerous pedagogy articles; to the best of this
author's knowledge, the authors of these pieces (or at least one of the authors,
for coauthored pieces) are legal writing faculty or were teaching legal writing at
the time the cited article was published.
132. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, In re MacCrate: Using Consumer Bankruptcy
as a Context for Learning in Advanced Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 50, 53
(2000) ("As Joseph Kimble succinctly and eloquently has said, '[W]riting is
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teaching generates knowledge about how any law professor can help
law students learn how to think like lawyers.
Legal writing scholarship is particularly relevant to the recent
reforms in legal education. As noted at the outset of this Essay, the
ABA has recently amended its standards for legal education to
require law schools to articulate outcomes, to include experiential
learning, and to include formative assessment. 133 Legal writing
scholars have written significant pieces in step with, or ahead of, the
reforms in each of these areas.
In the area of outcomes, Susan Hanley Duncan has written one
of the more widely cited articles addressing the potential impact of
outcome measures being added to legal education standards.134 She
noted the emphasis on learning outcomes in two watershed books, 135
Educating Lawyers136 (also known as the "Carnegie Report") and
Best Practices for Legal Education, 37 both published in 2007. That
same year, of course, legal writing faculty member Susan Thrower
was talking about identifying "learning goals" when designing skills
exercises for writing across the curriculum projects. 138 In 2012,
Deborah Maranville and others analyzed how outcome-focused
education in an engineering school could inform legal education,
thinking. Thinking on paper. Thinking made visible."' (quoting Joseph Kimble,
On Legal-Writing Programs, 2 PERSPECTIVES 43, 44 (1994))).
133. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
2015-2016 § 302, at 15, § 303, at 16, § 314, at 23 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015); see
supra text accompanying note 2.
134. Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards Are Coming
to a Law School Near You-What You Need to Know About Learning Outcomes
& Assessment, 16 LEGAL WRITING 605, 608 (2010) ("[An ABA outcomes
committee] examined relevant literature in the legal education field including
the Carnegie Foundation's report on legal education and the Best Practices
report published by Roy Stuckey and others, which pointed to the value of
incorporating outcome measures into the accreditation criteria." (footnotes
omitted) (first citing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007); then citing RoY STUCKEY &
OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP 77
(2007))). Dean Duncan taught legal writing for more than a decade before
becoming a Dean. See Susan Duncan, BRANDEIS SCH. L.,
https://louisville.edu/law/faculty-staff/faculty-directory/duncan-susan (last
visited Apr. 18, 2016).
135. Duncan, supra note 134.
136. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 134.
137. STUCKEY & OTHERS, supra note 134.
138. Susan E. Thrower, Teaching Legal Writing Through Subject-Matter
Specialties: A Reconception of Writing Across the Curriculum, 13 LEGAL
WRITING 3, 4 (2007) ("Exporting doctrine into the legal writing classroom is an
innovative way to achieve writing-across-the-curriculum goals to enhance and
increase student learning of skills, particularly the skill of writing.").
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paying "particular attention" to self-assessment skills that the ABA
has identified as significant. 139
But even back in the twentieth century, legal writing faculty
were focusing on the purpose of their various teaching methods,
asking about "learning goals," "teaching goals," and "pedagogical
goals."'140 As Lorraine Bannai and others noted in 1999, in an article
on designing effective legal writing assignments, "[a]ssignments are
not there simply as work for the students."14' Rather, assignments
need to be carefully designed and sequenced so that they
provide a vehicle through which students can learn the
foundation skills in legal research, analysis, and writing. The
key, of course, is for legal writing faculty to plan ahead and
think through exactly what it is that they want to teach. 142
Legal writing faculty have also contributed meaningful
scholarship to the area of experiential learning, particularly that
based on simulations of legal practice. As the Carnegie Report
notes, "The pedagogies of legal writing instruction bring together
content knowledge and practical skill in very close interaction."143
In 2004, Kathryn Stanchi noted that the typical legal writing course
139. Deborah Maranville et al., Lessons for Legal Education from the
Engineering Profession's Experience with Outcomes-Based Accreditation, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1017, 1019 (2012).
140. E.g., Maria Perez Crist, Technology in the LRW Curriculum-High
Tech, Low Tech, or No Tech, 5 LEGAL WRITING 93, 97-98 (1999) ("Whether one
approaches the LRW class as an opportunity to teach practical skills or to
develop legal cognitive skills, or both, the influence of technology on those
pedagogical goals is inescapable." (footnote omitted)); Elizabeth L. Inglehart et
al., From Cooperative Learning to Collaborative Writing in the Legal Writing
Classroom, 9 LEGAL WRITING 185, 187-88 (2003) ("The documented pedagogical
benefits that flow from cooperative and collaborative learning directly coincide
with our legal writing teaching goals."); Katrina June Lee et al., A New Era:
Integrating Today's "Next Gen" Research Tools Ravel and Casetext in the Law
School Classroom, 41 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 31, 33 (2015) ("Making
the latest next gen research tools a part of the skills classroom agenda advances
current pedagogical goals." (footnote omitted)); Sophie Sparrow, Practicing
Civility in the Legal Writing Course: Helping Law Students Learn
Professionalism, 13 LEGAL WRITING 113, 136 (2007) ("[Legal writing faculty]
identify the many learning goals involved in composing or drafting a legal
document, from large-scale organizing to analyzing and synthesizing statutes,
regulations, and cases, applying and distinguishing facts, using precise
language, and citing authorities accurately." (footnote omitted)).
141. Lorraine Bannai et al., Sailing Through Designing Memo Assignments,
5 LEGAL WRITING 193, 198 (1999).
142. RALPH L. BRILL ET AL., SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRITING PROGRAMS 13
(1997); Bannai et al., supra note 141, at 198-99 (footnotes omitted); Gail A.
Kintzer et al., Rule-Based Legal Writing Problems: A Pedagogical Approach, 3
LEGAL WRITING 144, 145, 151 (1997); Helene S. Shapo & Mary S. Lawrence,
Designing the First Writing Assignment, 5 PERSPECTIVES 94, 94-95 (1997).
143. SULLIVAN ETAL., supra note 134, at 110.
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"employs a pedagogy focused on experiential, cooperative learning.
It is a course based on simulation and problem solving and involves
a high degree of interaction between professor and student."144 Long
before that, however, legal writing faculty were examining the best
ways that simulation could be used in the legal writing course. In
1994, Professors Rideout and Ramsfield noted that most law
students "do not explore problem-solving in an environment that
simulates either law practice or rigorous legal scholarship, '"14 5 and
recommended that "legal writing professors and other faculty
should... creat[e] assignments that... simulate real practice."'146
In 1999, Debra Harris and Susan Susman noted that "legal writing
teachers increasingly recognize the value of lawyering simulations
in legal writing instruction."' 147  In 2001, Marie Monahan was
recommending that legal writing students conduct simulated
depositions as a way of developing the facts for a writing
assignment. 148 In 2005, Jane Gionfriddo described how simulations
help advance the learning goals in the legal writing course by
helping students understand why effective legal writing is so
vital.149
More recently, Nantiya Ruan traced the development of legal
writing teaching from the 1920s onward, noting that current
reformers emphasize both experiential learning and professional
values and that 'third wave' [legal writing] teachers simulate 'real
world' fact patterns to provide students with meaning and
context."150 Likewise, Sherri Lee Keene argued that "[g]uided legal
writing experiences ... afford writers meaningful opportunities to
integrate theory and practice by using their knowledge of law to
144. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors? A Socio-Feminist Critique
of the Status Hierarchy of Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 467, 493 (2004)
(footnote omitted).
145. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 73, at 37.
146. Id. at 82.
147. Debra Harris & Susan D. Susman, Toward a More Perfect Union: Using
Lawyering Pedagogy to Enhance Legal Writing Courses, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 185,
186 (1999).
148. Marie A. Monahan, Towards a Theory of Assimilating Law Students
into the Culture of the Legal Profession, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 240 (2001).
149. Jane Kent Gionfriddo, The "Reasonable Zone of Right Answers'"
Analytical Feedback on Student Writing, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 427, 430-31 (2005)("To provide students with an intimate sense of this audience's needs, legal
writing classes require students to work on simulated problems as if they were
practicing attorneys."). Gionfriddo also noted that teachers of courses focused
on legal doctrine usually did not use simulations in their teaching. Id. at 432
n.17.
150. See Nantiya Ruan, Student, Esquire?: The Practice of Law in the
Collaborative Classroom, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 429, 434-39 (2014).
308 [Vol. 51
FINISHING LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM
identify and solve a range of discrete legal problems while acting in
the attorney role."'151
Finally, legal writing faculty have long used formative
assessment as their signature teaching method. 152 Much of their
early scholarship, in particular, was devoted to articulating best
practices for formative assessment, whether or not the authors used
that term. 153 In 1998, Steven Johansen explained how "assessment"
differs from "ranking," in language that many would recognize as
the distinction between formative and summative assessment. 54 In
2002, Kristin Gerdy discussed how to advance learning outcomes by
developing "valid" assessment tasks,155 and in 2012 Anthony
Niedwiecki discussed using formative assessment "to better prepare
students for the practice of law ... in lawyering skills courses and
clinics."156
More importantly for purposes of reform in legal education,
much of the pedagogy scholarship has shown what law faculty can
accomplish beyond the skills curriculum. Carrie Sperling and Susan
Shapcott, for example, have analyzed mindset theory-a noted
subgenre of educational psychology-and shown how law students
affected by a fixed mindset can improve their learning if they move
to a growth mindset. 157 This scholarship (and its broad application)
is particularly significant in these days of low enrollment and new
standards for bar passage rates. Law faculty and the ABA have
151. Sherri Lee Keene, One Small Step for Legal Writing, One Giant Leap
for Legal Education: Making the Case for More Writing Opportunities in the
"Practice-Ready" Law School Curriculum, 65 MERCER L. REV. 467, 480 (2014).
152. See Carol McCrehan Parker, The Signature Pedagogy of Legal Writing,
16 LEGAL WRITING 463, 466 (2010) ("The hallmarks of the signature pedagogy of
legal writing are authentic tasks of an appropriate level of difficulty,
undertaken within a collaborative setting guided by a more advanced learner,
by way of an iterative process that includes frequent feedback and revision.").
153. See, e.g., Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Beth Beazley, Teaching Students
How to "Think Like Lawyers" Integrating Socratic Method with the Writing
Process, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 885, 897 (1991) ("Students depend on their teacher's
responses so that they may assess their own understanding of the substantive
material and assess how competently they have communicated that material to
a reader.").
154. See Steven J. Johansen, 'What Were You Thinking?" Using Annotated
Portfolios to Improve Student Assessment, 4 LEGAL WRITING 123, 123 (1998)
("[A]ssessment is primarily a tool for learning.").
155. See Kristin B. Gerdy, Teacher, Coach, Cheerleader, and Judge:
Promoting Learning Through Learner-Centered Assessment, 94 L. LIBR. J. 59, 70
(2002).
156. Anthony Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the
Metacognitive Skills of Law Students Through More Effective Formative
Assessment Techniques, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 149, 151 (2012).
157. See Carrie Sperling & Susan Shapcott, Fixing Students'Fixed Mindsets:
Paving the Way for Meaningful Assessment, 18 LEGAL WRITING 39, 66 (2012).
2016] 309
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
each begun to recognize that law students benefit when faculty in all
law courses implement the best pedagogy theories.
B. The Impact of Pedagogy Scholarship on Legal Practice and
Legal Policy
Pedagogy scholarship has undoubtedly advanced the effective
teaching of legal writing. As we have seen, it has also provided a
foundation for the current reforms in legal education. We do not yet
know what impact legal writing scholarship can have if legal writing
faculty are allowed to pursue their scholarly interests with the same
freedom enjoyed by other faculty. Even now, however, legal writing
faculty have built on pedagogy scholarship to write articles that
advance knowledge about legal practice and legal policy.
To date, legal writing scholarship has generated at least four
(often overlapping) subgenres: legal reading, 158 legal rhetoric, 159
document design, 160 and narrative reasoning. 161 These subgenres
have laid the foundation for the expansion of legal writing
scholarship from the classroom to the courtroom to the legislature
and beyond.
The pedagogy scholarship that asked students to consider the
needs of their "reader" led to further exploration of the act of
reading. Legal writing scholars now explore the impact of digital
reading on the practice of law 162 and on how consumers read
contracts and other documents. 163 When we consider how many
158. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of
Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163, 201-04 (1993)
(describing a teaching process focusing on the quality of students' reading, in
which students keep a reading journal and log reactions and questions to the
cases they read, instead of asking students to paraphrase cases).
159. Berger, supra note 118, at 155-57; Phelps, supra note 116, at 1094-95.
160. Robbins, supra note 127, at 110-11.
161. See Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers, and Merlin:
Telling the Client's Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal
Hero's Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 771-72 (2006) ("We implicitly
acknowledge that narrative is far more significant in law than merely one
delivery method of human communication."); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is
Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of
Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 30-31 (1998) ("Inherent in teaching the
application of law is the teaching of ... how to use the reasoning in judicial
opinions to determine which facts from the client's story are outcome
determinative.").
162. E.g., Ellie Margolis, Is the Medium the Message? Unleashing the Power
of E-Communication in the Twenty-First Century, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC
1, 1-2 (2015) ("[Diespite widespread recognition that technology has changed
the way that lawyers work, little scholarly attention has been given to whether
these changes have affected the form and substance of legal analysis.").
163. E.g., Mary Beth Beazley, Hiding in Plain Sight: "Conspicuous Type"
Standards in Mandated Communication Statutes, 40 J. LEGIS. 1, 30 (2014)
310 [Vol. 51
FINISHING LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM
legal issues require deciding whether a party had "knowledge," and
how often that knowledge will have been gained by reading, we can
imagine the potential impact of the scholarship by legal writing
faculty with expertise in legal reading.
And the teachers who told their students to remember logos,
ethos, and pathos now explore scores of rhetorical issues in their
scholarship. A bibliography published in 2006 highlights numerous
articles that explain "how rhetoric theory applies to the discipline of
legal writing."164 In other pieces, legal writing scholars explore the
use of rhetoric in parenthetical case descriptions, 16 5 the relationship
between rhetoric and e-mail,166 the relationship between rhetoric
and cameras in the United States Supreme Court,1 67 and rhetorical
themes in personal injury cases. 168
Likewise, the legal writing teachers who exhorted their brief-
writing students to help their readers by using more white space
and exploiting positions of emphasis became scholars who were able
to advise lawyers to design legal briefs more effectively 69 and to
(observing that "[p]sychologists, linguists, and information designers" have been
among those who have studied reader behaviors).
164. Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated
Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129, 129 (2006).
165. Michael D. Murray, For the Love of Parentheticals: The Story of
Parenthetical Usage in Synthesis, Rhetoric, Economics, and Narrative
Reasoning, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 183 (2012) ("The use of parentheticals in
explanatory synthesis is a device of modern legal rhetoric that constructs
knowledge and understanding of the role of precedents on the legal issue,
persuading the audience as to the correctness or superiority of the attorney's
knowledge and understanding of how the law works, and seeking to motivate
the audience to act in the rhetorical situation of the discourse.").
166. Kirsten K. Davis, "The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated"
Reading and Writing Objective Legal Memoranda in a Mobile Computing Age,
92 OR. L. REV. 471, 476 (2013) ("[T]he Article joins legal reasoning, legal ethics,
rhetorical theory, cognitive science, and reading studies to resurrect the legal
memorandum as a critical document of legal practice."); Kristen K. Tiscione,
The Rhetoric of E-Mail in Law Practice, 92 OR. L. REV. 525, 529 (2013) ("In
rhetorical terms, [e-mail] has altered the social construct of legal analysis.").
167. Lisa T. McElroy, Cameras at the Supreme Court: A Rhetorical Analysis,
2012 BYU L. REV. 1837, 1869 (2012) (noting the possibility of changing the
"rhetoric around the Court from mythicism to realism, from majesty and
aristocracy to democracy").
168. Lori A. Roberts, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Wrongful Abrogation of the
Collateral Source Rule in Personal Injury Cases, 31 REV. LITIG. 99, 103 (2012)
("[H]ighlighting evidence of the rhetorical themes of labeling the plaintiffs
medical bills as illusory or the plaintiffs recovery as a windfall to demonstrate
that this pronounced strategy is commonly embedded in appellate court
opinions.").
169. Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson, Telling Through Type: Typography and
Narrative in Legal Briefs, 7 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 87, 89 (2010)
(exploring a "content-driven, context-specific way that typography might be
used in legal briefs: to reinforce, complement, and independently create
narrative meaning"); see Robbins, supra note 127, at 115-18, 124.
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advise legislatures to be aware of positions of emphasis at the ballot
box. 170 And legal writing faculty who learned about teaching
storytelling as it related to the statement of facts are now writing
about narrative reasoning in complaints 17l and providing
sophisticated analyses of myth, rhetoric, and storytelling in briefs
and court opinions.1 72
If legal writing faculty are allowed the academic freedom to
pursue the scholarship of their choice, both legal education and the
legal profession will reap the benefits. Even with the current limits,
the impact of this field has been astounding. Ending the limits will
help not only legal writing faculty, but also the theory and practice
of law.
IV. NEXT STEPS FOR LAW FACULTIES, THE ABA, AND THE AALS
Law schools, the AALS, and by extension the members of the
ABA, have long benefitted from the teaching and scholarship of legal
writing faculty members. To further promote this teaching and
scholarship, and as a matter of equity, law schools should stop
limiting legal writing scholarship and start promoting the equal
treatment of legal writing faculty. Of course, there are also selfish
reasons for the ABA and law schools to take steps to promote
equality: as noted earlier, law schools risk becoming irrelevant if
they insist on clinging to the old ways of doing things, taking only
the most minimal steps to comply with educational reforms.
170. Beazley, supra note 126, at 22-23 (arguing that when governments
design ballots, they should "take into account the way that human beings
actually vote in order to fairly distribute the predictable benefits and burdens of
ballot position").
171. E.g., Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring
Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 LEGAL WRITING 3, 3 (2009) (noting that, "over
the centuries" the "narrative aspect of complaint ... has been eclipsed by the
several instrumental functions" of pleading); Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old
Story: Using Narrative Theory to Understand and Overcome the Plausibility
Pleading Standard, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 1, 2 (2014) (arguing that
"greater awareness of narrative theory and greater reliance on narrative
techniques can help litigants and judges understand and comply with" the new
plausibility standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
172. E.g., Linda H. Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand? Hamdi, Myth,
and the Master's Tools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 45 (2013) ("Narrative theory
and cognitive science can help traditionalists better understand the language of
critical theory-specifically, why critical theory insists on telling stories and
why those narrative critiques are legitimately a part of law." (footnotes
omitted)); Maureen Johnson, You Had Me at Hello: Examining the Impact of
Powerful Introductory Hooks Set Forth in Appellate Briefs Filed in Recently
Hotly-Contested U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 49 IND. L. REV. 397 (2016)
(analyzing the introductions in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015),
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), and other cases).
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Like it or not, market forces are already demanding changes to
legal practice, and many of the firms that didn't accommodate those
demands are now disappearing. Law schools that don't adapt may
meet the same fate.173 Keeping up with changes in legal practice is
particularly important in light of changes to laws governing legal
practice, 174 and in light of concerns about student preparedness and
bar passage rates. The Department of Education could rescind the
ABA's control over law school accreditation if it comes to understand
that the ABA is unable to promote practice-focused teaching or to
address concerns about diversity and inclusion.175 Likewise, state
bar associations could decide that they do not need to require
graduation from an ABA-accredited law school as a condition for
taking a state bar exam.
As noted above, most law faculties currently employ legal
writing faculty (and other full-time skills faculty) in low-caste
positions. To equalize treatment of these faculty, law schools must
address inequities in voting rights, in support for scholarship, and,
most significantly, in status and salary. To facilitate change, the
ABA and the AALS can and should form committees to identify best
practices for the transition to unitary faculties.
Addressing the voting rights issues is a first, cost-free step.
Law schools should grant voting rights to nontenure-track legal
writing faculty, and those rights should grant the vote on all
matters except promotion and tenure. There is no reason to exclude
nontenured skills faculty from voting on hiring matters; they are as
knowledgeable about faculty qualifications and law school needs as
anyone on the faculty. Limiting them from voting on hiring
173. It is likely that few law schools will close outright, but some may merge,
and many others will become leaner. See Deborah J. Merritt, Will the
Competition Close?, LAw SCH. CAFt (Dec. 29, 2013),
http://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2013/12/29/will-the-competition-close/. For
example, in 2015 two Minnesota Law Schools merged to form the Mitchell
Hamline School of Law. About, MITCHELL HAMLINE SCH. L.,
http://mitchellhamline.edu/about/, (last visited Apr. 27, 2016).
174. E.g., Myles V. Lynk, Implications of the UK Legal Services Act 2007 for
US Law Practice and Legal Ethics, 23 PROF. LAw. 26, 28 (2015) (discussing,
among other things, Britain's Legal Services Act of 2007, which "established a
national body, the Legal Services Board, independent of the courts and the bar,
to exercise regulatory oversight of the profession and of the approved regulators
that directly regulate the practice of law in England and Wales").
175. E.g., the regulations governing Title IX of the Civil Rights Act state at
34 C.F.R. § 106.51 ("Employment") that a recipient of federal financial
assistance "shall make all employment decisions in any education program or
activity operated by such recipient in a nondiscriminatory manner and shall not
limit, segregate, or classify ... or employees in any way which could adversely
affect any. . . employee's employment opportunities or status because of sex." I
am grateful for conference presentations by Lyn Entrikin, who first brought
these Department of Education regulations to my attention.
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prevents them from full participation in some of the most important
decisions that law faculties make.176
Second, law schools should provide appropriate scholarly
support to their skills faculty. This support can come in the form of
research support, summer grants, mentoring, and course reductions.
Scholarly support can give skills faculty an opportunity to
demonstrate that they are able to produce scholarship when they
receive the same treatment as those who teach casebook courses.
Finally, law schools must end discrimination as to status and
salary. Law schools that decide to end their discrimination against
skills faculty could begin by hiring all future full-time skills faculty
on the tenure track. They can and should, however, begin
immediately to follow best practices for those faculty on 405(c)
contracts.177
Remedying the situation for current nontenure track faculty
presents a different set of challenges. The Brahmins may protest
that moving contract faculty to the tenure track is inappropriate
because the law schools did not follow their usual "standards"-of
vetting previous scholarship or academic credentials, for example-
when hiring contract faculty. Those standards, however, are
typically used as predictors; they need not and should not be
requirements in the presence of quality of current performance. 178
Law schools hire faculty who performed well in law school or
who graduated from prestigious schools (or both) because they
believe that these credentials are markers that indicate that faculty
will be good teachers and scholars. If the legal writing faculty are
176. See, e.g., Patricia A. Wilson, Recreating the Law School to Increase
Minority Participation: The Conceptual Law School, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
577, 583 (2010) (describing faculty hiring as a "major decision" that reflects a
school's "mission").
177. Best Practices for Protecting Security of Position for 405(c) Faculty,
LEGAL WRITING INST., http://www.lwionline.org/uploads/FileUpload
/BestPractices.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
178. Richard E. Redding, 'Where Did You Go to Law School?" Gatekeeping
for the Professoriate and Its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 594, 608, 609 (2003) (lamenting the "erroneous assumption" that all
graduates of elite schools "are more promising than graduates of lower-ranked
schools" and observing that "the heavy emphasis on where a candidate attended
law school may mean that some candidates without stellar law school records
but with strong research training, a track record in publications, or important
legal practice or teaching experience get overlooked. The exclusion of
potentially excellent teachers and scholars from the legal academy limits the
possibilities-both for the academy and for individual careers .... Actual
performance in scholarship and teaching, rather than potential performance,
should be the coin of the realm"); see also Nancy B. Rapoport, Is '"hinking Like
a Lawyer" Really What We Want to Teach? 1 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS
91, 97 n.22 (2002) ("What I will never understand is why law schools focus so
much attention on the grades of a lateral hire, rather than on her demonstrated
ability to teach (evaluations) and research (publication record).").
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teaching and producing scholarship at the same level as a school's
tenure-level faculty,179 the performance of these faculty should be
more significant than the predictors.o80
If, however, the legal writing faculty are not good teachers, the
law school should deal with them as it should deal with any faculty,
including tenure-level faculty, who are not good teachers.' 8 ' If legal
writing faculty are good teachers but are not producing scholarship,
or are producing non scholarly articles, the faculty could take a
variety of steps to determine a future course of action. At some
schools, legal writing faculty on a contract have been given two
options: (1) the legal writing faculty member remains in the current
nontenure-level position, but with no expectation of scholarship or
(2) the legal writing faculty member receives scholarly support for a
set period of time, with the opportunity to meet clear scholarly
expectations 8 2 in order to move to a tenure-level position.
Law schools should be explicit and fair when articulating
scholarly expectations of tenure-level legal writing faculty.
Certainly, law schools can and should expect high-quality
scholarship from legal writing faculty. Quantity, however, may be
an issue, due to the high number of student contact hours in legal
writing courses. A law school might consider extending the tenure
clock for legal writing faculty, perhaps by asking what it would do if
it moved a non tenured faculty member into an administrative
position while that person was on the tenure clock. What would the
179. Law schools considering legal writing faculty scholarship should take
care to avoid bias against legal writing "topics," as discussed above. See
generally Pollman & Edwards, supra note 92, at 35-53 (addressing the myths
that legal writing topics do not count as scholarship and that legal writing
faculty are not qualified to evaluate legal writing scholarship).
180. Some law schools may believe that tenure positions require a certain
salary. Indeed, most legal writing faculty are underpaid, and a move to the
tenure-level should improve their salaries. See Christopher, supra note 101, at
65. But tenure itself does not require a particular salary. See Neumann &
Entrikin Memorandum, supra note 13, at 6-8. I know at one school, the faculty
voted not to replace a retiring faculty member, using the freed-up salary funds
to equalize the salaries of its tenure-level legal writing faculty.
181. Growth mindset theory indicates that weak teachers can become better
teachers with appropriate effort and guidance. Most universities now host some
sort of teaching effectiveness center that could engage with underperforming
teachers of legal writing or casebook courses. As noted earlier, of course, tenure
does not prevent termination for failure to perform mandatory duties. See
Neumann & Entrikin Memorandum, supra note 13, at 11 (citing cases in which
courts allowed termination of tenured faculty for bad teaching, and noting that
"every university has the power to fire tenured faculty who do their jobs badly").
182. To determine appropriate scholarly standards, law schools could look to
other schools of similar rank where legal writing faculty have received tenure.
315
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
scholarly expectation be? How might the timetable change? What
support would be given to that faculty member?18 3
Many voices have called for equal treatment of all full-time
faculty.18 4 Professor Deborah Merritt has called for a unitary tenure
track in her presentation and in her article for this very
Symposium.18 5 Likewise, at the AALS annual meeting in January of
2015, several speakers addressed gender-related employment issues
in legal writing and other areas of legal education. The resulting
symposium included several articles that called for equal treatment
of legal writing faculty. 8 6 Two months later, in March of 2015, the
Board of Directors of the LWI adopted a "Policy Statement on Full
Citizenship for Law Faculty":
The Legal Writing Institute is committed to a policy of full
citizenship for all law faculty. No justification exists for
subordinating one group of law faculty to another based on the
nature of the course, the subject matter, or the teaching
method. All full-time law faculty should have the opportunity
to achieve full citizenship at their institutions, including
academic freedom, security of position, and governance rights.
Those rights are necessary to ensure that law students and the
legal profession benefit from the myriad perspectives and
expertise that all faculty bring to the mission of legal
education. 187
The statement was also adopted by the Boards of Directors of
the ALWD and the Society of American Law Teachers ("SALT").
183. Any law school facing dilemmas regarding how to move contract faculty
to the tenure track could contact the current president of either the Legal
Writing Institute or the Association of Legal Writing Directors. Help is
available to determine stringent, but appropriate, standards for such a transfer.
184. E.g., Bayer, supra note 59, at 360; Durako, supra note 60, at 575-76;
Jewel, supra note 64, at 133 ("Placing skills on the same level as doctrine will
also halt the reproduction of a legal culture that reinforces existing power
relations."); Stanchi & Levine, supra note 15, at 20 ("General language
addressing the rights and privileges of law professors should be applied to all
full-time faculty, regardless of the courses they teach."); Stanchi, supra note
144, at 487.
185. Deborah Jones Merritt, Hippocrates and Socrates: Professional
Obligations to Educate the Next Generation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REv 403, 416
(2016) ("Those 'other members of the faculty' should enjoy the same status and
pay as professors who teach primarily appellate doctrine. Our caste system,
which distinguishes tenured faculty from clinical or writing professors, harms
the latter professors and perpetuates a false dichotomy in legal education.").
186. For examples of articles from that symposium, see generally
Christopher, supra note 101; Hart, supra note 77; Jewel, supra note 64; Tiscione
& Vorenberg, supra note 77.
187. LWI Professional Status Committee, LEGAL WRITING INST.,
http:/flwionline.org/LWIProfessional-Status-Committee.html (last visited Apr.
18, 2016).
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Two other groups in legal education, of course, are not on board: the
ABA and the AALS. As noted above, they have indicated explicitly
and implicitly that they are willing to administer a legal education
system in which a required subject area, explicitly identified as one
of the most significant, is taught by a large underclass made up
almost entirely of women, and almost entirely devoid of faculty of
color.
Each of these organizations is fettered in different ways. The
AALS does not have the power to force changes, because its bylaws
are more suggestions than mandates. Further, a law school might be
willing to sacrifice membership in AALS since students need not
attend an AALS member school to take the bar exam. 8 8 The ABA is
fettered in a different way: first, its consent decree prevents it from
inquiring into faculty salaries.18 9  Second, its educational
leadership-in the form of the National Council and the Committee
on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (the "Council")-
tends to be dominated by law school deans. 190 At the very least,
deans have a conflict of interest in recommending changes in status:
they know that if they have to move legal writing faculty to the
188. The AALS Bylaws provide a surprising amount of latitude. Article 2,
section 2 indicates that the organization gets to decide whether formal
compliance with the Bylaws is sufficient to allow membership, or whether
failure to comply with the Bylaws dooms membership:
In determining whether a school fulfills and can continue to fulfill the
obligations of membership, the controlling issue is the overall quality
of the school measured against the standards of quality articulated in
the Requirements of Article 6. The statements of Approved
Association Policy and the Regulations are designed to provide
guidance in making this assessment. They are not meant to be taken
as implying that formal compliance with their specific terms is
necessarily equivalent to satisfaction of the qualitative requirements,
or that departure from any of their specific terms is automatically
demonstrative of qualitative failure.
ASS'N OF AM. L. ScHS., supra note 24, §2-2, at 50.
189. United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.D.C. 1996)
("The ABA is enjoined and restrained from adopting or enforcing any Standard,
Interpretation or Rule, or taking any action that has the purpose or effect of
imposing requirements as to ... base salary, stipends, fringe benefits, or other
compensation... [and] collecting from or disseminating to any law school data
concerning compensation paid or to be paid to deans, administrators, faculty,
librarians, or other employees."). Note that the decree allows collection of such
data "upon receipt of a complaint concerning discrimination," as long as it does
not compare levels of compensation from one school to those of another school.
Id.
190. See also Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms of
American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. 55, 68-69 (2012)
(noting the conflict of interest and recommending that dean domination end and
that the Council should be controlled by members of the bench and bar).
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tenure track, salaries may have to go up,19 ' and it will be more
difficult to meet budgets. 192
The ABA and the AALS should each form committees to
consider how best to adjust the balance between scholarship and
teaching and to advance the equal treatment of full-time faculties 193
at law schools. The committees should include some deans, but
should include practitioners from a variety of fields and legal
writing and skills faculty-both those with tenure and those
without. Perhaps these committees could seek out consultation from
members of SALT, an entity that includes faculty members of all
categories. 9 4 These committees could consider a variety of options.
An ABA committee could consider how accreditation standards
could be changed. For example, one proposal that was brought
before the Council without success would have required each law
191. Of course, one way to equalize salaries would be for some faculty
salaries to go down to allow the salaries of skills faculty to go up. As Richard
Neumann and others have noted, tenure does not require any particular salary.
It would not be surprising, however, to find that certain faculty statuses are
tied to certain minimum salaries at individual schools or universities. See
Neumann & Entrikin Memorandum, supra note 13, at 7 ("Because tenure
doesn't protect salary, it does not, isolated from other factors, raise the cost of
education to any significant degree. To bring compensation in line with value, a
school can legally reduce the salary of any unproductive faculty member,
tenured or not.").
192. If flexibility is so important, it is interesting that the flexibility is
needed only in legal writing and other skills courses. Of course, the reality is
that deans might be glad to have more nontenure-track positions; casebook
faculty should recognize that their tacit approval of the status quo may open the
door to the elimination of tenure in the future.
193. Throughout this Essay, I have focused on status issues as they relate to
"full-time" faculty. I agree that it is appropriate not to make tenure available to
adjunct faculty. Some of my legal writing colleagues may fear that if the ABA
passes a rule requiring equality for full-time faculty, deans will respond by
turning legal writing positions into adjunct positions. Such a move would be
exceedingly foolish. If deans must save money by reassigning some courses to
adjuncts, they should make their decisions based on the number of student
contact hours-including formative assessment hours-that the teacher
provides. As indicated previously, full-time legal writing faculty typically spend
one-third to one-half of their semesters providing individual formative feedback
to their students. See supra, Part II. I surmise that clinical courses also
require high numbers of student contact hours. Accordingly, skills courses
should be the last courses that are taught by adjuncts. When drafting new
rules, the ABA might take care to use language that signals its preferences for
full-time faculty in skills courses, just as it has done in reference to first-year
courses. See ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHS. 2015-2016 § 403, at 28 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2015) ("The full-time faculty shall
teach substantially all of the first one-third of each student's coursework.").
194. SALT might be able to provide support in other ways. For example, it
could identify schools that have unitary faculty and champion their existence.
Schools that treat their faculty equally should get some recognition for going
beyond the discriminatory guidelines of the ABA.
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school to have equal status for all of its full-time faculty. A law
school could be made up entirely of contract-level faculty, but it
could not discriminate between and among full-time faculty based
on their subject area or teaching method. A standard of this type
would allow different types of law schools to flourish without
victimizing a subgroup within any particular school.
The ABA might also create a separate committee, with a higher
number of practitioners, to consider fundraising methods that would
help law schools to equalize the salaries of their faculties.
Practitioners constantly ask for more skills training; they might be
in the best position to help advance this goal. The ABA has a
fiduciary obligation to promote the goals of the legal profession;
surely those goals include fair treatment of the faculty who are
teaching this most important skill for the practice-ready lawyer.
Optimal student-teacher ratios may make teaching legal
writing more expensive than a lecture course, but it is far less
expensive to teach law students how to write while they are in law
school than it is to teach lawyers how to write while they are in
practice. I do many, many Continuing Legal Education ("CLE")
seminars on legal writing, but CLEs are best used for illustrating
writing principles for lawyers and perhaps reminding them of
principles previously learned (or of how new principles relate to
those old ones). A focused, multistep process is needed to teach
someone how to become a legal writer:
(1) a teacher must introduce and explain the rhetorical
contexts in which lawyers write, including requirements
peculiar to each;
(2) the student must produce a written product within an
understood rhetorical context;
(2) the teacher must review the product, diagnose any
problems, and articulate those problems to the student;
(3) the teacher must explain to the student, as needed, how to
solve the specific problems in the student's writing;
(4) the student must revise the writing, attempting to fix the
problems; and
(5) the teacher must re-review the writing to verify that the
student has understood the lesson. 195
195. Of course, this list does not even include the writing problems of
students who have sub-standard foundational writing skills. Legal writing
courses are focused on analytical method, but as many legal writing faculty can
tell you, formative feedback often includes feedback on foundational writing
skills.
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This sequence is time-consuming for both student and teacher,
and it would be a very expensive proposition for a practicing lawyer
to take this kind of time away from billable hours to go through this
process.
Law students are paying high tuition to attend law school; they
deserve to receive one-on-one formative assessment, diagnosis, and
feedback along with appropriate classroom teaching. Law firms that
help fund full-time tenure-line positions in legal writing196 would
help their own bottom lines by enabling more law students to take
not only better first-year writing courses, but also more
sophisticated upper-level courses. Further, more tenure-line
positions in legal writing could promote more scholarship about how
to teach legal writing more effectively and how to produce it more
efficiently in legal practice.
The ABA, of course, has more power to force change than the
AALS does. An AALS committee, however, could consider how the
AALS representative on site teams can advance the core values of
gender equality, diversity, and inclusion on law faculties. For
example, they could examine the variety of statuses on a law faculty
and consider whether they result in a disparate impact on women or
minority faculty, or result in lack of inclusion or occupational
segregation.
As noted above, the AALS Bylaws provide that the AALS
expects its members to "value" a "Core Value" of "a faculty composed
primarily of full-time teachers/scholars."'197 The AALS regulations
define faculty specifically to include legal writing faculty. 198
Accordingly, AALS site visit representatives should examine
whether all full-time faculty are similarly encouraged to do
scholarship, and whether academic freedom is limited as to subject
matter or in other ways. 199 Certainly the language "a faculty
composed primarily of full-time teachers/scholars" should not be
interpreted to mean that the Brahmins are the scholars while other,
low-caste faculty are the teachers.
As indicated above, the bias against legal writing and its faculty
has a significant impact on full-time women faculty at law schools.
Accordingly, when fighting this discrimination, it may also be
appropriate to explore methods used to combat the wage gap. For
example, on January 29, 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity
196. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 41 (discussing new ways to
fund law school clinics).
197. ASS'N OFAM. L. SCHs., supra note 24, § 6-1(b), at 58.
198. ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHs., Executive Committee Regulations, supra note 25,
§ 4.2, at 79.
199. As noted in note 100, supra, and in accompanying text, scholars in new
fields often face limits on academic freedom; an AALS representative would be
the perfect person to examine whether such limits exist at member schools.
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Commission, in partnership with the Department of Labor,
announced a proposal to collect annual summary pay data by
gender, race, and ethnicity; the data would be collected from
businesses with 100 or more employees. The proposal was
announced on the seventh anniversary of the signing of the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.200
Admittedly, the ABA is not allowed to inquire into salary data,
but the AALS does not have this restriction. Although the AALS
might ask for specific salary data, a more reasonable request would
be to ask for salary averages and gender data for each of the various
categories of full-time faculty at a law school. This data would
include the salary averages not only for each level of tenure-track
faculty, but also for the various categories of clinical, academic
support, legal writing, and other skills faculty who teach at the law
school. Further, it would be useful and appropriate to ask for the
averages of all full-time women and all full-time men within each
category. The most telling statistic, perhaps, would the average for
all full-time women separately from those of all full-time men. At
many schools, the high percentage of women in low-caste jobs could
drag down the average salary for all full-time women faculty.
It is hollow to claim that providing equal treatment to legal
writing faculty will hurt legal education. Law schools should
consider the message they send with their treatment of low-caste
faculty. As Sue Liemer and Hollee Temple have noted, "[i]t seems
hypocritical... for law schools to teach courses on employment
discrimination while rationalizing their own employment
discrimination as a great money saver."20' In 2005, Professor Ann
McGinley analyzed the treatment of legal writing faculty from a
Title VII perspective, and concluded that law schools could be legally
liable for employment discrimination. 202 She recommended that law
schools should work to equalize the positions of contract and tenure-
track faculty, noting that doing so "permits law schools to fulfill
their responsibility to their employees, their students, lawyers and
the community at large to create legal and ethical egalitarian
models of employment within the law schools."203
200. Agency Information Collection Activities: Revision of the Employer
Information Report (EEO-1) and Comment Request, 81 Fed. Reg. 5113
(proposed Feb. 1, 2016).
201. Susan P. Liemer & Hollee S. Temple, Did Your Legal Writing Professor
Go to Harvard?: The Credentials of Legal Writing Faculty at Hiring Time, 46 U.
LoUISVILLE L. REV. 383, 428 (2008).
202. Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination in Our Midst: Law Schools' Potential
Liability for Employment Practices, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 6 (2005).
Admittedly, the ABA might be able to "solve" this discrimination problem by
encouraging men and people of color to take second-class jobs. A more
appropriate solution, of course, is for it to mandate equal treatment.
203. Id. at 56.
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Law schools hurt legal education by allowing this inequitable
treatment to continue in the professional schools that should lead
the way in championing equality and inclusion. It is time for this
treatment to end and for law schools to ensure their continuing
relevance and vitality.
CONCLUSION
When I agreed to join this Symposium, I did not expect to spend
this much time focused on the status of legal writing faculty.
Frankly, I am tired of writing about legal writing status; I would
rather be writing about legal writing teaching methods, about how
consumers read and use legal documents, or about the impact of the
digital revolution on the practice of law. 20 4 I keep coming back to
status, however, because I am even more tired of the financial and
professional shackles that legal writing faculty must bear in order to
do their jobs. I have been teaching legal writing almost
continuously, in one form or another, since 1982.205 Many of those
who taught legal writing in the early 1980s left the field in disgust
or were forced out by capped contracts. Those who stayed, even in
the face of low status and low salaries, are now starting to retire. I
find it disheartening that these faculty, who taught side-by-side
with faculty colleagues teaching torts and contracts, faced an
unequal salary throughout their careers and now must face a
retirement that is just as unequal. 20 6 This mistreatment must stop.
It is time for the legal academy to practice what it preaches, and
give equal treatment to the full-time faculty who devote their
careers to preparing law students to enter the practice of law.
The ABA Standards for Legal Education are at best a paradox,
and at worst a paradigm of hypocrisy. The ABA, the AALS, and the
practicing bar have indicated that the effective teaching of legal
204. See generally Beazley, supra note 126; Beazley, supra note 95; Kearney
& Beazley, supra note 153.
205. I was a teaching assistant during the 1982-83 academic year. I taught
legal writing full-time from 1983-86 (as an instructor and a co-director); in
1987-88 I was an adjunct professor; I have taught legal writing full-time since
the 1988-89 academic year, first as a Director of Legal Writing, then as an
Associate Professor of Law, and currently as a Professor of Law.
206. See generally Martha Chamallas, Ledbetter, Gender Equity and
Institutional Context, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1043-44 (2009) (noting the
estimate that "an initial pay disparity of $5000 between two employees at the
start [of] their career will balloon into a $360,000 disparity at retirement age").
For more examples, see JESSICA ARONS, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
LIFETIME LOSSES: THE CAREER WAGE GAP 2 (2008), https://cdn
.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2008/pdf/equal-pay.pdf
(estimating $434,000 as the median amount a full-time female worker loses in
wages over a forty year period as a result of the gender wage gap); LINDA
BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER
DIVIDE 1 (2003).
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writing is crucial, and that gender equality and diversity are "core
values" 207 that law schools must "take concrete action" to promote. 208
Yet, these same ABA Standards lay out precisely the ways in which
law schools can discriminate against legal writing faculty, and the
AALS is complicit in their enforcement.
The legal academy and the practicing bar are fortunate that
many legal writing faculty have ignored or worked around the limits
they face, for legal writing scholarship is now bearing fruit in at
least three useful ways. First, of course, legal writing faculty have
developed a robust pedagogy for the developing field of legal writing.
Second, their pedagogy scholarship-and the teaching-focused
scholarship that has branched off from it-has laid a significant part
of the foundation for the current reforms to legal education. Finally,
pedagogy scholarship has also laid the foundation for legal writing
scholars to expand their academic contributions in ways that can
spur reforms not only in legal education, but also in the practice of
law and in public policy.
The ABA and the AALS have allowed a mostly white, mostly
female underclass to flourish in the legal academy. As law schools
implement new teaching methods and educational theories, they
should finally give equal treatment to faculty who have pioneered
those reforms, and recognize that it is just as valid to adjust
scholarship expectations for the sake of teaching demands as it is for
the sake of the demands of law school administration. And it is in
their own best interest for the ABA and the AALS to take the lead in
promoting these changes. If the ABA cannot use the accreditation
process to protect academic freedom, diversity, and inclusion,
perhaps it is time for the Department of Education to take back its
authority to control law school accreditation.
Continuing to balkanize the law school curriculum sends a
signal to the practicing bar that the Brahmins exist more to serve
their own interests than to educate future lawyers. Embracing
tenure reform will improve the chances of success for the new ABA
curriculum standards, will prevent legal education from becoming
an anachronism, and will ensure that law schools remain relevant to
the practicing bar.
207. See About, supra note 23.
208. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
2015-2016 § 205(b), at 12 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).
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